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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended,
and Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

This matter

was subsequently assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the appellants' ("Troy's") defenses raised on

the same notes and transactions sued on by the appellee ("Bank")
should have been dismissed on summary judgment pursuant to the
four-year statute of limitations (78-12-25, U.C.A., 1953 as
amended) based upon the second sentence of Section 78-12-44
U.C.A., 1953 as amended.
4

This issue was ruled on in summary judgment, therefore, the
standard of review is de novo.

The appellate court is to apply

the same standard as that applied by the trial court.
Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977).

Durham v.

The appellate court views

the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party belowf
(Troy) in determining whether those facts require, as a matter of
law, the entry of judgment for the prevailing party below.

The

appellate court is to give no deference to the trial court's
conclusions of law, which are reviewed for correctness.

Blue

Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989).
2.

Whether Troy's Counterclaims arising from the same

notes and transactions sued on by the Bank, should have been
dismissed on summary judgment based upon the four-year statute of
limitations, 78-12-25, U.C.A. 1953 as amended.
The standard of review on this issue is de novo.

The

appellate court is to apply the same standard as that applied by
the trial court.
3.

Durham v. Margetts, supra, 1332.

Whether the dismissal of Troy's Counterclaims, alleged

to have occurred in November of 1988, well into the four-year
limitation period, was appropriate on summary judgment based upon
the four-year statute of limitations, 78-12-25, U.C.A. 1953 as
amended•
The standard of review on this issue is de novo.

The

appellate court is to apply the same standard as that applied by
the trial court.

Durham v. Margetts, Id. at 1332.
5

4.

Whether there were genuine issues of material fact with

respect to Troy's Counterclaims remaining after the court's
ruling on the statutes of limitation issues (limited to Counts
Five and Six as relating to the November 1988 loan) to preclude
summary judgment being entered on those claims.
The standard of review on this issue is de novo. The
appellate court is to apply the same standard as that applied by
the trial court. Durham v. Marcretts, Id. at 1332.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case and Course of Proceeding:
This case involves the relationship and the solicitation and
funding of bank loans from the appellee (plaintiff —State Bank
of Southern Utah, hereinafter referred to as "Bank") to the
appellants (defendants —Troy Hygro et. al.., hereinafter referred
to as "Troy" or "Troy Defendants") to construct a greenhouse
facility in the New Castle area in Western Iron County, Southern
Utah.
Troy intended to borrow $170,000 for this project. However,
for various reasons and problems, as set forth below in the
Statement of Facts, this amount increased to $325,000.

The Bank

in May of 1985 committed to disburse this amount to Troy
immediately upon SBA approval ("initial loan") however, the Bank
failed to disburse the funds as promised.

The Bank eventually

disbursed the funds in October of 1985. As a result of this
delay problems with the New Castle project arose as set forth
6

below in the Statement of Facts.

Subsequent loans were made to

Troy by the Bank, including one for $60,000 on February 10, 1987
("1987 loan") and one for $49,000 to the Troy Defendants Keith
and Karen Sue Kehl in November of 1988 ("1988 loan").

Troy

contends and has maintained from the beginning that as a result
of the problems starting with the delayed disbursement of the
initial loan the matter became the Bank's problem.

The Bank

acknowledged this and attempted a number of ways to remedy the
problem over a period of years, including the 1987 and 1988
loans.

These attempts did not fully remedy the problem. The

Bank then commenced this action seeking the collection of the
initial loan and the 1987 and 1988 loans.
The Troy Defendants responded by way of an Answer and
Counterclaim alleging various counterclaims including: (l)Breach
of Agreement to Fund, (2) Wilful Breach of Contract and Economic
Duress, (3) Promissory Estoppel, (4) Negligent Structuring and
Disbursal, (5) Control and Self-Dealing, (6) Breach of Duties of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and (7) Accounting, Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief.

Similar claims were asserted by way of

affirmative defenses contained in Troy's Answer.
The Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking
the dismissal of Troy's Counterclaims based upon the four-year
statute of limitation, 78-12-25, U.C.A. 1953 as amended. The
Bank argued that all the claims asserted by Troy began to accrue
in September of 1985 (when SBA approval was obtained on the
7

initial loan, but the Bank didn't have the money).

Troy filed

its Answer and Counterclaim in June of 1991.
Troy opposed the Bank's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
arguing, among other things, that there was a writing concerning
the initial 1985 loan, i.e. loan documents, and thus, the sixyear statute of limitation provision (78-12-23 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended) should apply, rather than the fouryear statute.

Thus, the limitation period would not have expired

until September of 1991 three months after the Counterclaim was
filed.

Furthermore, the Bank's actions were on-going and

continuing with actions taking place as late as November 1988, as
set forth in the Statement of Facts below, well into the fouryear limitation period.
The court heard the Bank's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on June 24, 1992. The Motion was heard in two stages;
first the court heard argument on the statutes of limitation
issue, then heard further argument on the facts, following the
court's interim ruling on the statutes of limitation.

(June 24,

1992, Transcript, Exhibit "A", pages 3, 4 & 5). In its interim
ruling the court granted the Bank's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment with respect to the initial 1985 loan and the agreement
to fund upon SBA approval on grounds of the four-year statute of
limitation.

(June 24, 1992, Transcript pages 52 & 53). The

court granted the Motion with respect to counts One, Two and
Three of the Counterclaim dismissing them based on the statutes
8

of limitation except in relation to the 1987 loan for wrongful
disbursement.

(June 24, 1992 Transcript page 54).

Count four

was totally dismissed based on the statutes of limitation (June
24, 1992, Transcript page 56) and the remaining Counts, Five and
Six, were dismissed, except for the November 1988 loan, based
upon the four-year limitation period.

(June 24, 1992 transcript

page 57 through 60).
After the courts ruling on the statutes of limitation
issue, the argument and facts presented to the court, were
limited to the disbursement of the February 1987 loan and the
November 1988 loan.

(June 24, 1992 Transcript page 77). At the

conclusion of the hearing, Count One was dismissed except for the
wrongful disbursement of the February 1987 loan.

(June 24, 1992

transcript page 84). Counts Two and Three, which were previously
limited to the 1987 loan disbursement, were totally dismissed.
(June 24, 1992 transcript page 85)

Count Four had already been

dismissed by the court based on the statute of limitations.
(June 24 1992 transcript page 86-87).

Counts Five and Six

remained dismissed except for the 1988 loan.
The court took under advisement the Motion with respect to
Counts One relating to the disbursement of the 1987 loan, and
Counts Five and Six in relation to the November 1988 loan.

The

court then dismissed Count One except for the issue whether the
disbursement of the February 1987 loan constituted a breach of
contract; and dismissed the remainder of Counts Five and Six
9

which were in relation to the November 1988 loan.

See Order

dated June 24, 1992. (Exhibit "B").
The Bank then sought the dismissal of Troy's defenses by
filing another Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based upon the
statutes of limitation as before. Troy opposed the motion
arguing, among other things, that a party's defenses to an action
are not subject to and therefore cannot be barred by the statutes
of limitation; and even if they were the same limitation period
should be applied to the defenses (the six-year limitation period
in this case) as to the action brought. Troy also argued that
summary judgment was not appropriate for the factual issues
pertaining to Troy's tort claims.
The hearing on this Motion was held on October 9, 1992, and
the court granted the Bank's Motion and dismissed Troy's defenses
based upon the statutes of limitation.

In doing so the court

relied on the last sentence of Section 78-12-44 U.C.A. which
deals with the effect of payment, acknowledgment, or promise to
pay.

(October 9, 1992 transcript, Exhibit "C", page 32).

The

statute specifically provides as follows:
78-12-44. Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or promise to
pay. In any case founded on contract, when any part of the
principal or interest shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment
of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay
the same, shall have been made, an action may be brought within
the period prescribed for the same after such payment,
acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise
must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby.
When a right of action is barred by the provisions of any
statute, it shall be unavailable either as a cause of action or
around of defense, [underlining added]
10

The court in its analysis of the last sentence of this
Statute stated that, "it appears that the last sentence goes
beyond the purpose of the paragraph itself."
transcript page 32-33)
attorney, Mr. Higbee.

(October 9, 1992

This was agreed to by the Bank's
(October 9, 1992 transcript page 33). The

court took the matter under advisement.

However, the court

stated that it was inclined to dismiss the defenses based upon
the same reasons the court dismissed the Counterclaim.

(October

9, 1992 transcript page 68).
The court entered an Order dated November 13, 1992 granting
plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment consistent with
the court's previous findings. The only issues left for trial
was the amount of attorney's fees and the improper disbursement
of the February 1987 loan.

See Order dated November 13, 1992.

(Exhibit "D")
The trial was held on December 10, 1992, limited to these
issues.

(December 10, 1992 transcript, Exhibit "E", pages 5-6)

At the trial Troy was precluded from presenting evidence
concerning anything other than the disbursement of the 1987 loan
based upon the court's prior rulings on summary judgment.
(December 10, 1992 transcript page 38). Because of the court's
prior rulings on summary judgment the court never considered the
facts relating to Troy's defenses or Counterclaim.

The Troy

Defendants appeal from both of the court's rulings on summary
judgment.
11

Statement of Facts:
1.

Troy intended to borrow $170,000 to build greenhouses

in the New Castle area.

(M.Kehl Depo. pages 159-160, 163). Troy

owned land in the area and was leasing land adjacent thereto from
Mr. Boyd Christensen.

Troy was operating greenhouses which it

previously built on the Christensen property.

Troy intended to

build additional greenhouses on their property.

Troy did not

want to purchase more property, but wanted to make use of the
idle property already available in the area.

(M.Kehl Depo. pages

115, 157-166, 195; June 199^ Affidavit of M. Kehl para. 3;
Markell Depo. pages 33-35).
2.

The business plans and proformas for costs and income

projection submitted were based upon a loan of $170,000.
(Markell Depo. pages 197-198; M.Kehl Depo. pages 33-381 156-166).
Furthermore, the proformas indicated to the Bank the time
restrictions placed on the project.
123).

(Markell Depo, page 57 &

Construction on the greenhouses was to commence by the end

of July 1985.
3.

(Markell Depo page 56).

During this period of time, Christensen suddenly

requested that Troy purchase the property it had been leasing for
a purchase price of $150,000.

(Markell Depo. page 41). Troy did

not believe that there was any way to borrow the $170,000 fcr the
construction of new greenhouses and purchase the Christensen
property for $150,000.

(Markell Depo. pages 40-44, 161)

12

The

project was dead and over, an impossibility as far as Troy was
concerned. (Markell Depo. page 49; June 1992 Aff. M.Kehl par. 4).
4.

At that point, the Bank (Officer, Lee Fife) intervened

and encouraged and pressured Troy to pursue the matter advising
Troy that it should borrow the $325,000 ($150,000 to purchase
Christensen's property and $170,000 build the greenhouses) for
the same purpose and collateral offered for the $170,000 loan.
(M.Kehl Depo. page 192). Troy consulted with the Bank regarding
the value of the property located here in Utah and the Bank
insisted that Troy could borrow the $325,000.

(M.Kehl Depo pages

191-194; June 1992 Aff. M.Kehl para. 4; Markell Depo. pages 3338).
5.

The Bank stated that it would take care of everything

so Troy could get the loan, including filling out the necessary
loan documents and forms, and dealing with the Small Business
Administration ("SBAM).

Troy looked towards the Bank as its

financial advisor on the New Castle project and representative
before the SBA.

(M.Kehl Depo. pages 191-194; June 1992 Aff.

M.Kehl para. 5; Markell Depo. pages 33-38).
6.

As an officer at the Bank, Mr. Fife obtained an

appraisal on the property from Mr. Jack H. Carpenter, a Certified
Appraiser in Cedar City, valuing the property at $562,000 as of
May 3, 1985.

See copy of May 7, 1985 letter.

(Exhibit "F").

The Bank provided this appraisal to the SBA in support of the
loan.

(The loan was guaranteed by the SBA at 90%).
13

In May of

1985, the Bank promised and committed to Troy that the money
would be available to them immediately upon SBA approval.
(M.Kehl Depo. page 199; June 1992 Aff. M.Kehl para. 6-8). The
Bank continually represented to Troy that the funds would be
available immediately upon SBA approval.

(Markell Depo. pages

34,39, 49-53, 59-69).
1.

This commitment was known to the Bank as evidenced in

the Affidavit of Lee Fife, wherein he states that contrary to the
Bank's commitment, the money was not available upon SBA approval.
See copy of Affidavit of Lee Fife, paragraphs 14 & 15.
M

GM).

(Exhibit

At no time prior to the SBA approval did the Bank tell or

inform Troy that the money may not be available immediately upon
SBA approval. (Markell Depo. pages 34,39, 49-53, 59-69; June 1992
Aff. M.Kehl para. 7-8).
8.

After this time the Bank became even more involved in

the financing of the project.

The involvement of Troy became

more of simply obtaining instructions from the Bank.

(M.Kehl

Depo. page 202). Troy proceeded with the steps necessary to
complete the loan as instructed by the Bank.

(M.Kehl Depo. pages

199-202).
9.

Troy continually informed the Bank of the time

limitations and the need to obtain the money immediately upon SBA
approval to commence with construction before winter weather and
that any delay by the Bank would result in miserable working

14

conditions and effect the planting of the crop and thus
jeopardize the overall project.
10.

(Markell Depo. pages 65-76).

After SBA approval was obtained the Bank failed to loan

the money to Troy as promised.

(Affidavit of Lee Fife,

paragraphs 13 & 14, Exhibit "G"; Markell Depo., pages 65-80, June
1992 Aff. M.Kehl para. 9). It was not until later that Troy
discovered that the Bank did not have the money to lend.
(Affidavit Lee Fife, paragraph 13, Exhibit "6"; Markell Depo.
page 81).
11.

The Bank did eventually disburse the funds; however,

the Bank's delay resulted in a variety of problems, including
those which Troy had continually warned the Bank about.

As a

result construction was delayed as well as the planting of the
tomato crop resulting in loss profits, increased expenses and
cash flow problems on the New Castle project.

(Markell Depo

pages 93-98, 195; M.Kehl Depo. pages 246-291; 268-269; June 1992
Aff. M.Kehl para. 9-10).
12.

The Bank realizing that it was responsible for these

problems tried to remedy the situation by loaning Troy an
additional $60,000 in February of 1987.

(M.Kehl Depo. pages 267-

274; June 1992 Aff. M.Kehl para. 11; Markell Depo. page 104).
The Bank realized that it was responsible for the problem.
(Affidavit of Lee Fife, para. 13; M.Kehl Depo. pages 286-287;
Markell Depo. page 105). The $60,000 loan was directly
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attributed to the Bank's delay in disbursing the funds.

(Markell

Depo. page 113)
13.

As evidence of the parties' relationship and the Bank's

control over the Troy Defendants, the $60,000 loan was totally
controlled and manipulated by the Bank.

The settlement records

for the $60,000 loan prepared by the Bank contain fictitious
payments shown to be false by later accounting.
M.Kehl para. 12-18)

(June 1992 Aff•

See Settlement Papers (Exhibit "HM) compared

to letter dated February 20, 1987 (Exhibit "I").

The Settlement

Papers further show receipt of funds on February 20, 1987 even
though the documents were signed ten days earlier on February 10,
1987.

The $60,000 was evidently used to pay off loans with the

Bank contrary to representations made to the SBA and in the
Settlement Papers.
14.

The $60,000 loan did not remedy the problems caused by

the Bank and the Bank continued to exercise its control over the
project to remedy the situation.

(M.Kehl Depo. pages 283-292).

The Bank continued to come up with a number of creative financing
packages for this purpose.
15.

In November of 1988, the Bank in another attempt to

remedy the situation put together another loan this time for
Keith and Karen Sue Kehl with the Five County Association of
Governments.

The money was for the purchase of a delivery van

($21,000) and so Keith Kehl could lease the New Castle site.

16

(Markell Depo., pages 166-167).

As part of the loan package Troy

Hygro Systems Inc., put up $20,000 in equity.
16.

There were also problems with this loan as the $20,000

put up by Troy Hygro Systems Inc., went directly to pay off the
Bank.

Troy Hygro Systems Inc., was not the borrower on this

loan, yet was listed as the borrower on the majority of the loan
documents.

Keith and Karen Sue Kehl were not liable on the

previous SBA loans, however, the Bank in execution of this loan
had Keith and Karen Sue Kehl sign personally on the previous SBA
loans•
17.

The Bank provided further forms of creative financing

after November of 1988, which included unsecured loans to the
employees or principals of Troy Hygro Systems Inc., personally
who with the Bank's knowledge and approval would then deposit the
money at the Bank to make an SBA payment.
to Donald Kehl and Jim Markell.

Such loans were made

(Markell Depo., pages 112, 134

and 137) .
18.

The Bank by its continuing actions was allowed to

control and manipulate the situation and delay its accounting to
Troy, the SBA and bank regulators.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1*

Troy's defenses raised on the same notes and

transactions sued on by the Bank should not have been dismissed
on summary judgment pursuant to the four-year statute of

17

limitations (78-12-25 U.C.A. 1953 as amended) based upon the
second sentence of Section 78-12-44 U.C.A* 1953 as amended.
a.

A statute of limitation as a general rule is not a bar

to asserting a claim as a defense.

The Troy Defendants are

entitled to their claims to the extent of the amount claimed by
the Bank regardless of the statute of limitations period.
b.

The second sentence of 78-12-44 pertains to the effect

of payment, acknowledgment or promise to pay as addressed in the
first sentence and the heading of the statute.

It was not

intended to change or circumvent the long-standing rule that
defenses are not barred by the statute of limitations.
2.

Troy's Counterclaims arising from the same notes and

transactions sued on by the Bank should not have been dismissed
based upon the four-year statute of limitations, 78-12-25 U.C.A.
1953 as amended.
a.

The Counterclaims are based upon loan transactions for

which there is a sufficient writing for the six-year limitation
period to be applied. 78-12-23 U.C.A. 1953 as amended.
b.

The Counterclaims are based upon transactions and a

relationship with the Bank which continued through November of
1988 and thereafter, with the Bank's action falling well within
the four-year limitation period.
3.

There are genuine issues of material fact relating to

Troy's claims not barred by the statute of limitations (limited

18

to Counts Five and Six relating to the 1988 loan) but dismissed
on summary judgment, to preclude the entry of summary judgment.
a.

There are material issues of fact concerning the

Bank's relationship to the Troy Defendants at the time of the
1988 loan.
b.

There are material issues of fact regarding the

Bank's actions with respect to the 1988 loan.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DEFENSES RAISED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BASED ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

As a general rule the statute of limitations do not apply to
defenses raised by a party.

Smith v. Idaho St. Univ. Federal

Credit Union. 760 P.2d 19 (Id. 1988).

The statute of limitations

never run against defenses arising out of a transaction sued
upon.

Alles-Chalmers Corp. v. City of North Bonneville, 775 P.2d

953 (Wash. 1989). Cf. Viehwev v. Thompson, 647 P.2d 311 (Id.App.
1982); Warren v. Washington Trust Bank, 575 P.2d 1077 (Wash.App.
1978) and Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co. v. Apodaca, 524 P.2d 874 (Wyo.
1974).

There is no statute of limitations for filing defenses,

so long as the main action itself is timely.

Seattle First

National Bank, N.A. v. Siebol. 824 P.2d 1252, review denied 833
P.2d 386 (Wash.App. 1992).

Such defense survives as long as

plaintiff's claim can be asserted, even though defendant's claim
would be otherwise time barred by the statute of limitations if
brought as an affirmative defense. Aetna Finance Co. v.
19

Pasauali. 626 P.2d 1103 (Ariz.App. 1981).

The statute of

Limitations is available only as a shield and not as a sword.
Dredge Corp. v. Wells Fargo. Inc.. 389 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1964).
This general rule is applicable to instances where an
untimely claim is raised as a defense to a suit on a promissory
note, Dawe v. Merchants Mortg. and Trust Corp.. 683 P.2d 796 on
remand 754 P.2d 418 (Colo. 1984).

For a case on point see

Seattle First National Bank v. Siebol. supra. (Exhibit "J")
dealing with a bank loan where the borrowers alleged that the
bank breached an oral promise to provide financing as an
affirmative defense in an action by the bank to recover on loans
made to the borrowers.

The trial court in that case held that

although the statute of limitation time had expired, the statutes
of limitation never run against defenses arising out of a
transaction sued upon.

The trial court allowed the defenses in

and granted the borrowers a set off for lost profits based on the
borrower/s defenses.

This ruling was affirmed by the Washington

Court of Appeals. Id.
This general rule is recognized and followed in the State of
Utah.
M

Jacobsen v. Bunker.1 699 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1985); (Exhibit

K M ) (although party was not entitled to affirmative relief

because it was time barred, party was entitled to defense up to

*• Jacobsen v. Bunker, supra. actually involved California
law, but the Supreme Court presumed it to be the same as Utah law
and thus, ruled in accordance with Utah law.
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the amount of the note).

This position was raised by memoranda

and argued before the court.
32-35).

(October 9, 1992 transcript pages

The court acknowledged this general principle, i.e. that

the statutes of limitation do not apply to the defenses of an
action.

(October 9, 1992 transcript page 34).

The court however ultimately ruled that Troy's defenses were
barred by the statutes of limitation.

The basis of this ruling

was the last sentence of Section 78-12-44 U.C.A., 1953 as
amended, which provides as follows, "When a right of action is
barred by the provision of any statute, it shall be unavailable
either as a cause of action or ground of defense."

(October 9,

1993 transcript page 32). The court immediately realized that
interpreting this second sentence as proposed by the Bank, took
the sentence way out of the purpose of the paragraph and even the
statute itself.

(October 9, 1993 transcript page 33). The

Bank's position took the sentence totally out of context simply
arguing that, "it says what it says."

(October 9, 1992

transcript page 33).
The court was correct in its initial impression of the
statute.

Under general rules of construction and interpretation,

a sentence contained in a writing should not be isolated, but
should be considered in reference to the writing as a whole.
Barnhart v. McKinnev. 682 P.2d 112 (Kan. 1984).

The trial court

erred in isolating and then applying the second sentence of
Section 78-12-44 U.C.A., dealing with the effect of payment,
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acknowledgment or promise to pay, to circumvent the long-standing
principle and general rule that the statutes of limitation do not
apply to a defense to an action that has been brought.
constitutes a mistake of law.

This

It prejudiced the Troy Defendants

and requires a reversal of the court's order granting summary
judgment on Troy's defenses.
The provisions in Section 78-12-44 U.C.A., enacted in 1951,
are intended for cases dealing with the effect of acknowledgment
or part payment on the tolling of the statutes of limitation.

It

is to limit the common law rule regarding the tolling of the
statutes of limitation, which tolls the limitation period in all
actions, in cases of acknowledgment or part payment.

78-12-44

U.C.A. is intended to restrict the tolling to only those actions
founded upon contract, Yeraensen v. Ford, 402 P.2d 696 (Utah
1965) and further provides that such acknowledgment must be in
writing signed by the party to be charged thereby.

This limited

purpose is supported by subsequent case law.
In Yeraensen v. Ford. 402 P.2d 696 (Utah 1965)(Exhibit "L")
the Utah Supreme Court actually interpreted the last sentence of
Section 78-12-44 U.C.A.

The Court limited its interpretation to

the effect of payment, acknowledgment or promise to pay.

The

Court found that, "a reasonable interpretation of the last
sentence of this statute would compel the conclusion that any
statute which bars a right of action is conclusive unless its
operation is suspended by the specific provisions of 78-12-44.
22

Id. at 697.

Therefore, if the provisions of 78-12-44 U.C.A. are

not met the statutes of limitation will not be tolled.

No one in

this case has claimed that the statutes of limitation should be
tolled under this provision.

Therefore, the second sentence of

this provision should not be pulled out to bar any claimed
defenses by the Troy Defendants.
Furthermore, there was no finding by the Court that the
second sentence meant that the statutes of limitations all of a
sudden applied to defenses of a claim.

This would have been a

substantial change meriting some finding by the Court.

There was

no finding that this sentence forever changed the long-standing
principle that the statutes of limitation do not apply against
defenses to an action.

Moreoverf there are no statutes of

limitation, and none have been adopted, barring the right to
raise a defense to an action.
In addition, the second sentence of this statute has never
been given such a wide interpretation as to replace or supersede
the general rule or principle that the statutes of limitation do
not apply to defenses.

The fact that defenses are not subject to

the statutes of limitation continues to be the general rule, and
continues to be the general rule in the State of Utah.

Utah

courts have so held since 78-12-44 U.C.A was enacted in 1951.
See Jacobsen v. Bunker. 699 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1985) (Exhibit " K M ) ;
Seattle First National Bank, N.A. v. Siebol, supra. (Exhibit "J")
and other cases following this general rule which have been cited
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above2.

To hold otherwise would totally circumvent the long-

standing principle concerning defenses and the statutes of
limitation, and also undermine the important principles of due
process and a desired trial on the merits.
II.

TROY'S COUNTERCLAIMS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
DISMISSED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON
THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Troy's Counterclaims should not have been dismissed based
upon the four-year statute of limitations.

The Counterclaims are

based upon the same transactions and loans documents that the
Bank is suing on therefore, there is a sufficient writing for the
six-year provision of Section 78-12-23 U.C.A. to apply.3
The Bank's argument on this point is that there is not an
exact term in writing regarding the Bank's, now undisputed
promised/ to have the funds available immediately upon SBA
approval.

(June 24, 1992 transcript pages 22-23).

However, it

is not necessary that the exact term sought to be enforced be in
writing for the six-year provision of Section 78-12-23 U.C.A. to
apply; it can even be oral, as long as it relates to or grows out
of a written instrument.

Evans v. Pickett Bros. Farms. 499 P.2d

2

. It is worthy to note that the Bank has failed to cite any
cases holding that the second sentence of 78-12-44 U.C.A. is a bar
to raising a defense to an action after the statutes of limitation
have run. Absent such a showing, the general principle should
remain intact.
3

.
If the six-year provision is applied the Counterclaim
filed June 1991 would be timely even under the Bank's argument that
the time for filing commenced September 5, 1985.
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273 (Utah 1972); (Exhibit "M") . In Pickett Bros. Farms the
actual obligation arose out of an oral promise made to pay the
plaintiff while the parties were negotiating a written contract.
The Court found that the obligation to pay and breach thereof
arose out of the written contract the parties later agreed to and
the Court imposed the six-year limitation period. .Id. at 275. In
this case, there is a writing concerning the initial $325,000
loan.

The Bank agreed to disburse the funds for the initial loan

upon SBA approval.

The Bank however failed to do so and delayed

in disbursing the funds as provided for in the written loan
instruments.

This failure or breach relates to the written loan

documents and thus falls within the six-year statute of
limitations provision.
Even if the four-year limitation period is applied Troy's
Counterclaims are based upon numerous transactions and its ongoing relationship with the Bank which commenced in 1985 and
continued through November 1988 and thereafter.
of Facts Nos. 15-18)

(See Statement

Therefore, Troy's Counterclaim dealing with

the November 1988 loan should not have been dismissed by the
court on summary judgment based on the four-year limitation
period4.

4

. The trial court did not even consider issues of fact in
regards to these claims, because it previously ruled that the
claims were barred by the statutes of limitation.
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III. THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT RELATING
TO THE LIMITED CLAIMS NOT BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, BUT DISMISSED
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
There are genuine issues of material fact relating to the
limited claims not barred by the statute of limitations, but
dismissed on summary judgment.

These limited claims are Count

Five for Control and Self-dealing and Count Six for Breaches of
Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.
As set forth above in the Statement of Facts, the Bank's
relationship and action with Troy was continuing and continued
well into November of 1988. The delay in funding the initial
loan for $325,000 was only the start of a continuing
relationship, which evolved into a deeper relationship, involving
other loans and actions by the Bank, giving rise to allegations
of control and self-dealing and breaches of good faith and fair
dealing.

This was all subsequent to September of 1985 and

continued through November of 1988.
The Bank has admitted that the $60,000 loan was to resolve
the funding problem with the $325,000 loan and the $60,000 loan
was not made until February 10, 1987. Again in November of 1988,
the Bank made loans to the defendants and materially changed the
terms of the original loan documents.
15, 16 & 17)

(Statement of Facts Nos.

This action occurred in November of 1988 and

certainly presents an issue of fact on the November 1988 loan in
relation to Troy's Fifth and Sixth Claims for Control and Self-
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dealing and Breaches of Good-faith and Fair dealing.

These

counts should not have been dismissed by the court on summary
judgment.
There is also an issue of fact as to whether a special or
fiduciary relationship was developed between the Bank and the
Troy Defendants. Although a lender is generally not in a
fiduciary position, facts and circumstances often arise which
create a fiduciary relationship.

A fiduciary relationship does

arise when the banks become financial advisors.

This is

particularly true when there has been a relationship established
for a period of time, justifying the customer's reliance on the
Bank to act in his best interest.

Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank,

64 P.2d 101, 106 (Ariz. 1937); Deist v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188
(Mont. 1984).

In the instant case, Troy relied on the Bank to

act in its best interest.

The Bank failed to properly disburse

funds to Troy and was acting as a financial advisor to Troy on
how to generate cash and obtain money from the SBA to alleviate
the problems.

The Bank is also a fiduciary to Troy pursuant to

statute, as the trustee on the deeds of trust securing the loans
in this case.

Section 22-1-1 et. seq. U.C.A. 1953 as amended.

The Bank also exercised control over the Troy which is
sufficient to give rise to a fiduciary relationship.

A.G. Jensen

Farms Co. v. Carqill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).

The

Bank's control and dominance over Troy was so substantial that
Troy's operations and affairs in Utah rested totally in the
27

control of the Bank.

Troy is an out-of-state family run business

and relied heavily on the Bank for its financial advise. This
was especially true since Troy ran into its problems as a result
of the Bank's failure to timely fund the initial loan. Troy
relied totally on the Bank's creative financing ideas to remedy
the situation.
Furthermore, there is evidence that the Bank paid itself
first from the proceeds of the November 1988 loan, contrary to
what was represented to the SBA and without full disclosure to
Troy.

This alone raises issues of fact concerning the Bank's

self dealing.

Rosenberaer v. Herbert. 232 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1967).

A fiduciary owes a duty of "utmost good faith and scrupulous
honesty" and has "a corresponding obligation to made good faith
disclosures of all facts relevant to the transaction."

Kirbv v.

Cruce, 688 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Tex.App. 1985); Mevers v. Moody, 693
F.2d 1196, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982).

The Bank breached its duty to

disclose all relevant information to Troy in this case and Troy's
claim for control and self dealing should not have been dismissed
on summary judgment.
Moreover, factual issues are present in this case invoking
the imposition of liability for the breach of a duty of good
faith and fair dealing.

Wallis v. Superior Court, 207 Cal.Rptr.

123, 129 (1984); Seaman's Direct Buying Serv.. Inc. v. Standard
Oil Co.. 686 P.2d 1158 (Calif. 1984).

For one, the parties were

in inherently unequal bargaining positions.
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This is particularly

true after the Bank failed to disburse the initial funds, which
put Troy in financial straits from the beginning and subject to
the Bank's control.

Second, Troy was especially vulnerable

because of the harm it would suffer if the Bank refused to remedy
the situation as a result it had to place a great deal of trust
in the Bank to perform; and finally, the Bank was aware of Troy's
vulnerability.

All of these factual issues are relevant

concerning the Bank's fiduciary duty to Troy and the breach of
the Bank's duty of good faith and fair dealing occurring on the
November 1988 loan; therefore, the Bank's motion for summary
judgment on these claim should not have been granted.

Wallis v.

Superior Court. 207 Cal.Rptr. 123, 129 (1984); Seaman's Direct
Buying Serv.. Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.. 686 P.2d 1158 (Calif.
1984)
CONCLUSION
The defenses raised by Troy are not subject to the statutes
of limitation and should not have been dismissed on summary
judgment.

Troy's Counterclaim should not have been dismissed on

summary judgment.

The trial court's granting of summary judgment

on these issues should be reversed.
The Final Judgment, Decree and Order of Foreclosure entered
by the District Court should be set aside. The case should be
remanded back to the District Court for a trial on the merits
with Troy's defenses and Counterclaim intact.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IRON, STATE OF UTAH
HON. ROBERT F. OWENS, judge

STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH,
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vs.
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

(Tape-Recorded Proceedings)
REPORTER'S HEARING TRANSCRIPT
Wednesday, June 24, 1992
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CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
BY: THOMAS M. HIGBEE, ESQ.
250 South Main Street
Cedar City, Utah 84720

For the Defendants:

BROWN & BROWN
BY: BUDGE W. CALL, ESQ.
505 East 200 South
Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
P.O. BOX 1534
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770
(801)673-5315

2
1

CEDAR CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 1992

2

-oOo-

3
THE COURT:

4

The matter is before the Court on

5

Plaintiff's —

or rather Defendants' — yeah —

Plaintiff's

6

motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim in State

7

Bank of Southern Utah versus Troy Hygro Systems, Inc.

8

Have we lost counsel for —

9

MR. HIGBEE: Mr. Call just hustled out to get

10

his briefcase, Your Honor.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. CALL:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. CALL:

15

THE COURT: All right.

16

MR. CALL:

17

THE COURT: And Mr. Higbee for the plaintiff, I

18

| guess?

I see. All right.
Sorry.
Tell me your name.
Budge Call.

On behalf of the defendants.

And in this case, we're just dealing with the

19

counterclaim; so, it's counterclaimant and

20

counter-defendant.

21

MR. HIGBEE:

22

THE COURT: Are both counsel ready to proceed?

23

MR. HIGBEE:

24
25

That's correct.

The plaintiff is prepared to go,

Your Honor.
THE COURT: And, Mr. Call, are you ready to go?

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

3
1

MR. CALL:

2

THE COURT: Now, by way of suggestion, I'm

3

wondering if it would make sense to argue this in two

4

stages dealing first with the — what's usually a threshold

5

issue, and that's the statute of limitations issue and give

6

an opportunity, since attention spans are not as long

7

sometimes as they are when we're younger, to give attorneys

8

on both sides a chance to rebut on that point and not have

9

to try to keep it in mind while a lot of other matters are

10

Yes, Your Honor.

being covered.

11

Do counsel agree with that?

12

MR. HIGBEE:

13

THE COURT: And then go on to the more

14

That would be fine, Your Honor.

substantive matters after that.

15

MR. HIGBEE:

16

MR. CALL:

17

THE COURT: All right.

18
19

That would be great.

That's fine.
And since you're the

moving party, Mr. Higbee, you may proceed.
MR. HIGBEE:

I will, Your Honor.

There are a

20

couple of preliminary matters that I need — one,

21

specifically.

22

yesterday on some depositions in another matter.

23

I got to my office this morning, I found that I had

24

received in yesterday's mail an Affidavit of Michael Kehl

25

in opposition to this motion. And I'd like for the record

I received —

I was in St. George all day

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

And when

4
to object to the Affidavit and move to strike it on the
grounds that it does not meet the evidentiary rules
required by Rule 56. As Your Honor well knows, it must
meet the substantive evidentiary requirements.
Generally stated, the gist of the objection goes
to lack of foundation and improper conclusions in summaries
rather than statements of fact that would be admissible at
trial.

There are several conclusions set forth in the

Affidavit without the supporting facts upon which those
conclusions are based.

I'd be happy to address them one

paragraph at a time, or I can just state them generally as
I've indicated, and Your Honor can deal with it in the
course of the presentation.
THE COURT: Well, before I have you respond,
Mr. Call, I read the Affidavits just before court. My
impression is that the matter presented in them generally
doesn't bear on the statute of limitations issue, is that
correct, but rather on the substantive issues?
MR. HIGBEE:

That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, perhaps we can —
defer.

we can

It would take a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis.

I

noticed in places, the language was couched in terms of
Troy said this or did this.
corporation.

And obviously it's a

It would have had to have been represented by

a person who could be a witness in court. And so some of

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

5
those things, I suppose, we'd have to come to grips with.
But there may —

rather than doing it now, why don't we

defer the ruling and even further argument on the motion
until after the —

the statute of limitations matters have

been presented.
MR. HIGBEE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Any objection to that?
MR. CALL: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.

That means that you'll have

to remember that it's pending.
MR. HIGBEE: As long as I've got my motion on
the record, we'll hit it when it comes up, I'm sure, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. HIGBEE:
writing.

I —

I apologize for not having that in

the motion.

I just didn't have time to get

it here.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. HIGBEE: With -- with Your Honor's
indulgence, I would like to —

to take just a minute and

outline for the Court who the players are, and who the
parties are so Your Honor has those players clearly in mind
as we talk about who said this, and when they said it, and
when we quote from depositions, Your Honor will know who
we're talking about.

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
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1

settlement sheet signed by Mike Kehl saying where the

2

$60,000 loan went.

3

Mike Kehl's Affidavit, he states that he didn't —

4

didn't sign that when that was filled in.

5

letter from the bank sent to Troy stating that the loan —

6

the $60,000 loan was disbursed directly, contrary

7

another writing —

8

disbursed, which is directly contrary to the settlement

9

statement that he —

10

Part of the loan documentation.

he

There was a

—

a letter telling them how the loan was

that he signed.

I don't see how he can say that we can't point

11

to any written documentation showing that they didn't

12

disburse the funds as they agreed.

13

different contradictory writinas- themselves —

14

themselves that contradict.

15

In

THE COURT: All right.

And when there's two
two writings

I think we've probably

16

adequately addressed that one.

17

ruling on this, because it may slim down the arguments from

18

here on out.

19

Let me make an interim

The motion for partial summary judgment — and

20

I'm going to partially grant the motion for partial summary

21

judgment with respect to the — basically the — what

22

appeared to me when I reviewed the file as the main thrust

23

of the cause of action, the breach of the agreement to fund

24

upon approval of SBA.

25

that matter on grounds of being barred by the four-year

I'm going to grant with respect to

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
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1

statute of limitation, the motion for partial summary

2

judgment.

3

that in some later arising six-year statute do not appear

4

to the Court to be in accordance with the —

5

understanding of the law.

6

The attempts to relate back or somehow include

my

Also we're dealing with two separate contracts.

7

And that would also be a finding that I would make in

8

support of this ruling to that point, back in 1985, the

9

basic loan agreement, and something that is separate from

10

that, and that is the timing of —

11

type of argument that whether it conflicts with it or not

12

at least was not part of the written agreement.

13

appears to the Court that that also has to be in writing to

14

get the advantage of the six-year statute.

15

under any theory of the law that I'm aware of in any way

16

merge with the written contract.

17

time is of the essence

And it

That it doesn't

So I'm granting the motion with respect to

18

counts one, two and three of the counterclaim with respect

19

to the transaction in 1985.

20

And I have some trouble with the transaction in

21

1987, which was a written transaction.

22

as I'm sure my questions have indicated, it appears to me

23

that the disbursement — when we're going to matters or

24

questions of disbursement or breach arising from the manner

25

of disbursement, we have left the ground of contract, and

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
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And in that case,
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we're now in the area of performance where the statute of
limitations would not apply.

Well, it applies to the

timing of the breach, but there would be the advantage
there that if the original contract, which is alleged to
have been breached, is in writing, that then the six-year
statute applies. And of course we're still within that
six-year statute.

And so I'm denying the motion with

respect to the February loan and again limiting it with
respect to the allegation that the breach consists of
wrongful disbursement.
That is —

I realize that we're going to be

arguing other things, but that's just in the statute of
limitations field right now.
MR. HIGBEE:

Your Honor, it occurs to me that

there's one aspect that —
address.

that maybe we didn't fully

They claim other things in connection with the

February 20th, 1987 loan.

They claim negligence, and they

claim breach of duty of good faith, and they claim
control.

It seems to me those are not claims founded on an

instrument in writing, that the instrument in writing is
only relating to contract claims.
that's what the statute says.
THE COURT:

Now

MR. HIGBEE:

In fact, I believe

I think it says —

and so —

~

— we still need to address the

issues of the negligence, the bad faith and the control

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
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associated with the February 20th, 1987 loan.
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. HIGBEE:

I was going on to that.

I'm sorry, Your Honor.

If you'd

you should have told me to sit down and be quiet.

—

I

wouldn't have been offended.
THE COURT: We'll go on to count four —
to separate these all in my own mind —

I have

the negligent

structuring and disbursal of loan proceeds.
There, I'm not — well, I just ruled, I guess,
that for statute of limitation purposes for breach of
contract, the six-year statute would apply to that.

I'm

not sure that a negligent claim would, because
[ negligence — we jump over the fence to another theory that
seems to not have the two steps of it to be covered only by
the four-year catchall statute of limitations.

Because

when the nature of the claim is negligence, it doesn't seem
to matter whether it arose from a written contract, from a
car accident, from whatever.
animal.

It's a negligent four-year

This hasn't been argued.

But if either counsel

has any law that bears on that, I'd be happy to hear it
before I —

I rule on that one.
MR. HIGBEE: Your Honor, it's in the brief. The

name of the case is Au versus Au.
that case, there was the same —

It's a Hawaii case. In

a single transaction that

gave rise to several different legal theories.

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
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1

Court held squarely that in such a situation, the different

2

statute of limitations apply to the different legal

3

theories.

4

1981. A quote from the case.

5

action arise from a single transaction, different statutes

6

of limitation are applicable to the separate" —

7

The citation is —

THE COURT:

Yes.

is 626 P.2d 173, Hawaii
"Where two or more causes of

I realize that general

8

principle.

But did that case involve the distinction

9

between the type of negligence that arises from contract,

10

and then the distinction between written and oral

11

contract?

12

MR. HIGBEE:

13

THE COURT:

It did not, Your Honor.
Okay.

So I'm just assuming that

14

that does not matter. And I think that's probably

15

correct.

16

So with respect to count four, which appears to

17

be a —

18

are the manner of disbursement —

19

main thrust —

20

going to grant the motion for partial summary judgment, and

21

that's ordered dismissed.

22
23
24
25

based on negligent actions, whether those actions
I think that that's the

or whether the making of that loan, I'm

Now — which brings us to the control, self
dealing, breach of duty, of good faith and fair dealing.
If we're dealing with, say, a —

a crack in the

sidewalk or something that is a single identifiable type of
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breach of duty or negligence that continues, I think that's
one thing.

In this case, from what I've read in the file,

it appears that we're dealing with several different types
of things. And under those circumstances, I think that we
have to look at each incident individually to determine
statute of limitation questions.
Of those incidents —

specific incidents, it

appears that only the November, '88 loan to Keith Kehl is
within the four-year statute of limitations prior to the
filing of the counterclaim; so, I'm granting also the
motion for partial summary judgment with respect at this
point to all of the matters except that particular single
incident.
Now, are there any others that I've missed that
are within the statutory period that were intended to be
included in that?

I don't see them in the pleadings•

MR. HIGBEE: They're not, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.

So as far as statute of

limitations is concerned, that one is —

now, the — and

that covers both five and six.
Now, seven, the accounting, declaratory relief
and injunction —
dismiss that one?
unnecessary.

to clean up the pleadings, do we need to
That seems to me totally superfluous and

You're entitled to —

MR. HIGBEE: As I stated, Your Honor, we
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obviously have to prove the balance as part of our cause,
and we think that — that it's —

I really don't know what

they want, to be honest with you.
THE COURT: Well, if you file a foreclosure
action, I've never heard of an injunction being filed in
the same court enjoining you from proceeding with its
action.

I —
MR. HIGBEE: Yeah.
THE COURT:

I would suppose that that can be

addressed by a motion to continue or dismiss or things
within that action.

We're not dealing with two courts, and

of course Utah can't enjoin whatever is happening in
Wisconsin.

So —
MR. HIGBEE: We would move to dismiss that

claim, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. CALL: No.
THE COURT:
on —

Okay.

Then it's ordered dismissed

well, I'm not sure what grounds.

Let's see.

Those

were in Mr. Call's stipulation?
Or do you not want to stipulate?
MR. CALL: We can just —

we'll just stipulate

to that.
THE COURT: Okay.

We'll do that on

stipulation.
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So what we have left now are —
MR. CALL:

I have just one question

—

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. CALL:

—

on the negligence as to count

four.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. CALL:

Now, my understanding is that the

negligence claims were being dismissed because they were
not in relation to the written document?
THE COURT: Well, no.

I'm accepting as —

for

purposes of argument, this point that they were in
relationship to the written document, but that didn't turn
them into six.year —
MR. CALL: Right.
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

—

rather than four year.

That was my question.

THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. CALL:

So that —

as far as November, 1988,

then., that count four would still be —
THE COURT:

Let's see. Now, that was included

also in the negligence.
the

still —

I suppose to be consistent with

~
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:

Okay.
I was not aware that that was

included in that.
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MR- CALL:

Well, it —

MR. HIGBEE:

For the record, in the

interrogatories, they didn't say that specifically.

There

was so much cross-referencing, that perhaps that was —
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. HIGBEE:

—

followed in.

THE COURT: All right.
ruling, then, for count four.

I don't know.

Wellf let me revise my

It's dismissed except for

the November, '88 transaction.

And I hope this doesn't get

confusing, because we'll still be arguing other matters,
and that may cause some sort of revision.
MR. HIGBEE:

I'm clear —

But —

I think I'm clear on

it, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

So what do we have left?

have one, two, three out completely.

We

Four out except for

November, '88. Five and six out except for November, '88.
And both of those deal with disbursement.
MR. CALL:

I'm sorry.

You're confusing me.

Now, my understanding is that one, two, three —
one, two, three were out completely with respect to the '85
transaction.
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. HIGBEE:
THE COURT:

You're right.

You're right.

And I think that's correct.
Yeah.

You're right.

But it's still

in with respect to the '87 and I suppose '88 transactions.
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MR. CALL:

I was going in reverse —

order that he addressed them.
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

the reverse

So I was —

So that I sort things out —
I think —

I think basically most of

our claim for the negligence and the breach of duty of good
faith, improper control and economic duress dealt with
the —

with the previous two loans.
As far as the —

the November, 1988 loan, our —

our claim for the negligence is the fact that Keith Kehl
was supposed to borrow the money, and Troy was to guarantee
it.

And that was the agreement they had.

ended up that Keith —

However, it

Troy borrowed the money, and Keith

ended up guaranteeing the total SBA loan of $325,000. And
that was on the urging and control that Lee Fife had in —
in the Troy Hygro operation here in Utah.
THE COURT: Assume there's all the control in
the world involved in that transaction.
did any damage occur?

In what way was —

That's the point that I think

interests me more.
MR. CALL: Well, as far as Keith Kehl is
concerned, he is liable —

I mean he's liable for the

$325,000 loan, although he only received $49,000.
THE COURT:

So you're talking about the

disbursement stage again rather than —
MR. CALL:

Right. He — well, he was
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1

I says it's limited to $25,000 of all of the prior loans. So

2

he's not obligated for 325, he's obligated for the 25,000.

3

It was written in the agreement; it was signed by the

4

parties.

He obviously knew what was going on.

5

see it —

I honestly can't see a factual basis to keep that

6

in.

7

And I can't

THE COURT: Well, now again, he knew that there

8

had been an allegation.

I'm not sure that there's much

9

evidence yet as to — well, fraud hasn't been alleged.

I

10

should maybe go back and reread the depositions myself on

11

that particular point, since we zeroed in on it.

12

believe we'll take that one under advisement.

13

MR. HIGBEE:

So —

so count one, breach of the

14

agreement fund, is dismissed except for wrongful

15

disbursement?

16

THE COURT: Wrongful disbursement on the '87

17

loan.

18

that.

19
20
21
22

So I

And on the '88 loan, I will take another look at

MR. HIGBEE: And on the '88 loan, failure —
what —

okay.

On the '88 loan —

THE COURT:

See, there's not a wrongful

disbursement allegation on that one, is there?

23

MR. HIGBEE:

No, sir.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. CALL: What's -- what's that?

That's just simply
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MR. HIGBEE:

1

I say on the '88 loan, there's —

2

the judge inquired if there was a claim for wrongful

3

disbursement on the '88 loan. And as I understand it,

4

there's not.

5

reversed, and that Keith Kehl was forced into signing the

6

guarantee.

There's just two claims that the parties were

7

MR. CALL:

Yeah.

8

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

9

MR. CALL: Maybe —

10

you just —

11

causes of action do not —

That's right.

The —

it may be easier for you if

it's sort of hard on the —

because all of the

12

THE COURT: Well, let me go through them.

13

MR.- HIGBEE:

14

track.

15
16

I think the judge is on the right

THE COURT: My ruling on the other points, and
let me answer those questions.

17

I'm going to dismiss totally count two, the

18

theory of economic duress.

19

even a threshold showing of that in the depositions.

20

It appears to me there's not

Also count three, promissory estoppel, seems

21

to —

22

loan, which was has been dismissed on other grounds. So

23

I'm going to also dismiss that as a theory.

24

don't feel the elements are shown.

25

as a theory, seems to relate primarily to the '85

Also because I

Next, the count four, negligent disbursal. As
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1

far as breach by wrongful disbursal, that's been preserved

2

as a —

3
4

in the '87 loan as part of count one.
MR. HIGBEE:

negligence.

It was dismissed as to the

It was kept alive as part of the contract.

5

THE COURT:

Yeah.

6

MR. HIGBEE:

That's right.

So count four was dismissed.

7

was count one on the contract —

8

was kept alive.

It

the written document that

9

THE COURT:

10

the negligence for a minute and —

11

existence of a duty.

12

ruling that the '87 action on the '87 contract is barred by

13

the statute of frauds; so, that would give rise to the

14

duty.

15

Yes. That's it.

negligence requires the

I'm not at this point, of course,

MR. HIGBEE:

Your Honor —

Your Honor ruled that

16

it was barred by statute of limitations.

17

four-year statute of limitations on that.

18
19

THE COURT:

You're right.

We've got a

As a theory, it's

barred.

20

MR. CALL: Yeah.

21

MR. HIGBEE:

22

THE COURT: Right.

23

MR. HIGBEE: The same —

24

THE COURT: Right.

25

But let me revisit

It's still alive on the contract.

right.

I'll stay with that ruling.

Now, counts five and six I've been thinking of.
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1

MR. CALL:

So —

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. HIGBEE:

Tom, so count four is —

Count four is totally out.
Count four is negligence all the

4

way through, and it's totally out on the statute of

5

limitations.
THE COURT:

6
7

The November, '88 transaction,

however, is still alive as part of count one.

8

MR. HIGBEE: '87.

9

THE COURT:

Yeah.

The '87 transaction —

10

transaction.

11

contract through the performance.

But the only theory that —

loan

is the breach of

MR. HIGBEE: And that's on the failure to

12
13

Or '87.

disburse.

14

THE COURT: Yes.

15

On counts five and six, I'm going to dismiss

16

both of those counts except possibly for the '88 loan to

17

Keith Kehl. And that's one that I want to look at also

18

with respect to count one; so, that is under advisement.

19
20

And then of course count seven has been
dismissed on stipulation.

21
22

MR. HIGBEE:

I think that's exactly right, Your

Honor.

23

THE COURT: Okay.

Anything else?

I'll try

24

to —

25

on that at one point before I leave and go back to

what time is it?

Quarter to 4:00.
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STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH,
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vs.

]

TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.,
et al.,

]

Defendant.

)

ORDER

Civil No. 900901153

The Court having taken under advisement the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment with respect to causes of action 1 and 5 & 6 with
respect to the November 1988 loan, now rules as follows:
1.

The first cause of action of the Counterclaim is dismissed

except for the issue whether the disbursement of the February 1987
loan constituted a breach of written contract.
5 & 6.

The fifth and sixth causes of action are dismissed, as

they are now framed, with leave to amend to state proper theory
relating to the November 1988 loan, insofar as it relates to the
liability of Keith Kehl, and the issue whether he was misled by
Plaintiff to his damage in the papers he signed.
DATED this 24th day of June, 1992

ROBERT F. OWENS
District Judge by Appointment

ORDER - Civil No. 900901153
June 24, 1992
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1

MR. HIGBEE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

2

only saying that half facetiously.
Yeah.

And I was

3

THE COURT:

I realize it.

4

So on that point, then, the motion for partial

5

summary judgment would be denied, and we'll leave that open

6

for trial.
And now we'll go ahead with your other points,

7
8
9

Mr. Call.
MR. CALL: Well, I think another thing that

10

needs to be addressed, and that is the —

11

were raised.

12

As far as —

the defenses that

as I recall the last time we came

13

down here on a $325,000 loan and on the $60,000 loan, in

14

our memorandum, we raised arguments regarding our defenses

15

and counterclaims, and the plaintiff's counsel raised the

16

statute of limitations.

17

counterclaims were barred based upon the four-year

18

limitation, and therefore, we never got a chance to address

19

those issues.

20

And the Court ruled that the

However, now they're taking the position that

21

because of the statute of limitations, the claims were also

22

barred as defenses —

23

defenses to the loan documents. And our position is that

24

where it was — where it was their motion for summary

25

judgment to dismiss our counterclaims, that may be true,

not only as counterclaims but also as
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1

but whereas they're seeking summary judgment, then issues

2

of fact that are raised in our defenses should be

3

considered by the Court and preclude summary judgment.
THE COURT: Well, they cite Utah 78-12-44 as

4
5

specifically stating that if a defense is of the nature —

6

or cause of action, that a ruling by the Court barring it

7

under statute of limitations also makes it unavailable as a

8

defense.

9
10
11
12
13

Let me look at that.
Have you looked into that allegation?

That

would seem to be a —
MR. CALL: No.

I just —

I was just —

I just

received their reply today, and I was looking at that.
THE COURT:

Okay. Well, I suppose even though,

14

none of us have had enough time to do our homework on it,

15

if it's there, and it states it that baldly, then it would

16

appear to be conclusive on that issue.

17

look it up here — 44.

18

MR. HIGBEE:

19

paragraph, Your Honor.

20
21
22

THE COURT:

78-12 —

let me

The last sentence of that
Of that section.
"Effect of payment, acknowledgment

or promise to pay.
"In any case founded on contract, when any part

23

of the principal or interest shall have been paid, or an

24

acknowledgment of an existing liability" —

25

appears this last sentence appears to go somewhat beyond
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the purpose of the paragraph itself, doesn't it?
MR. HIGBEE:

Yeah. As I read that, Your Honor,

that was exactly my feeling.

That should have been two

paragraphs instead of just one, because the first sentence
and the last don't seem to relate to each other.
But it says what it says, and it —

and it seems

to be —
THE COURT:

It doesn't specifically say it is

limited only to a — these certain defenses.

"When a right

of action is barred by the provisions of any statute, it
should be unavailable" —

of course my code here doesn't

have the annotations.
Are there any cases construing that?
MR. HIGBEE:
in our —

Your Honor, we don't have Shepard's

in our office.

I just got Mr. Call's brief on

Monday; so, I haven't had time to go to a law school or
anything like that.
office.

We don't have Shepard's in our

To my knowledge, there are none in all of southern

Utah.
But I read all of the annotations cited, and
there's no reference to that second paragraph.
annotations are to the first paragraph.

All the

Whether there's a

case that's been decided under that that might be in the
Shepard's that's not in the annotations, I can't say.
THE COURT:

It would seem to be anomalous to —
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MR. CALL: Well —
THE COURT:

— to allow a defense that isf say,

like payment in the nature of an offset that has already
been adjudicated as a —
limitations.

beyond the statute of

On the other hand —

let me think this

through.
MR. CALL:

If I —

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. CALL:

if I could, Your Honor.
Go ahead.

If I could, Your Honor, in —

in my

research of the issue, what I've found generally is the
statute of limitations is —

can be a bar to a

counterclaim, but it cannot —
apply to defenses.

it does not necessarily

In other words —

THE COURT:

I think as a general rule, that's

correct.
MR. CALL: Right.
THE COURT: However, we're talking about a
refinement of that rule in the cases where defenses are in
effect a possible separate cause of action as obviously by
definition is the case of the one set forth in your
counterclaim.

I suppose the common sense basis for it is

that if you think somebody has slandered you 4 0 years ago,
and you don't do anything about it, and then they sue you
on an independent —

separate transaction 40 years later,

you certainly can't —

you're beyond the statutes for suing
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them.
The question is should you be permitted to raise
that now as a defense to their just debt.

And that would

appear to be the policy underlying them.
MR. CALL: Well, I think what the general policy
is is that if —

if two parties enter into a transaction,

and it goes beyond the limitation, then they —
they can't raise a counterclaim.

you know,

But certainly if —

if —

if they enter into it, and then one party tries to enforce
or do something —

or do something, I think the other — I

think the other party has a right to any defenses that
would have occurred, because they were not necessarily put
on notice of those defenses., if. you know what I'm trying to
say.
In other words, they may not necessarily want to
raise —

raise the defenses until after they are —
THE COURT:

Sued.

MR. CALL: Yeah.

Under fire.

THE COURT: Well, doesn't that contradict the
policy of the statute of limitations, which is a statute of
repose in cases of very old claims that witnesses have
died, and it would be very hard to adjudicate it now that
the parties —
MR. CALL: Not necessarily.

Because it would be

taken into account on the bringing of the suit.
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1

would also take into account the defenses.

2

if the writing were six years, and they bring the suit,

3

they'd have to bring it within the six years, and then any

4

defenses to that writing, you know, could be alleged, and

5

it would be within the same period.
In other words —

6

In other words,

in other words, they may

7

not —

they may have — you may have defenses to something

8

which has occurred, but you are not raising them,

9

because —

because they are not affirmatively seeking

10

relief from you.

11

and —

12

somebody would go ahead and pursue those claims.

13

And I mean otherwise you'd have to go out

I mean everyone that would have a claim against

THE- COURT: Well, I think that would be the

14

case —

15

payments along, you certainly wouldn't be barred from

16

raising those just because you've been paying for many

17

years.

if it's all the same transaction, and you're making

18

MR. CALL:

19

THE COURT:

Let me hear from Mr. Higbee on that

MR. HIGBEE:

Your Honor, my arguments on this

20

In ~

point.

21
22

point are fairly concise and to the point.

23

Your Honor has pretty well hit everything I wanted to

24

raise.

25

And I think

The first one is, Your Honor, that these are not
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it's all kinds of headaches. And when we had a little
problem in scheduling six weeks ago, I told Budge to get
ready, because I had every intention of asking Your Honor
to set it for trial before the end of the year.

And I

would still like to do that. And I believe that we're at
the point now where after a year and a half in litigation,
the parties ought to be able to admit or deny things. And
I would like to go through some of these things.

I think

we'll save ourselves a lot of preparation and a lot of time
at trial if I know where they're coming from.
THE COURT: Well, let me make this preliminary
statement.

Based on what I've heard today and what I see

in the file — and I want to review the files more
carefully to make sure I'm not missing something —

I will

probably be granting partial summary judgment on everything
except the improper disbursement on the 60,000 loan, which
is going to be an issue I would assume that could be tried
probably in an hour, at most. And the only reason I'm
raising this is to kind of get a handle or an idea as to
how long a trial might take.

If that turns out to be the

only issue on which I don't grant summary judgment, then I
would presume that we could —
in the next 10 days —

and I can make that decision

I would presume that we can have a

trial date, depending on courtroom availability.
THE CLERK: Do you want me to go get the
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calendar, Your Honor?
THE COURT:

I think we'll need it.

In about a month.

I would guess that a lot of

preparation is not going to be necessary on that single
issue.

It sounds like it's going to be a one witness on

each side type issue.
counsel.

I'm just thinking out loud now,

Feel free to break in if —
MR. CALL: Well, Your Honor, if that's your

inclination, then —

then I would —

you know, I would —

you know, I would agree with that.
But I mean if —
I mean this could be —

if —

depending on your ruling,

could be a big case.

And I have

people and out-of-state —
THE COURT: Yeah.
cards.

I don't think it's in the

I —
MR. CALL: Okay.
THE COURT:

I really don't —

you know, the same

reasons that I ruled on the merits on the counterclaim I
think are going to be applicable on the merits.

At least

some of those matters. The fair dealing, good faith and so
forth, as defenses. And of course partial summary judgment
can be granted with respect to a defense, either allowing
it or excluding it. And I don't really see factual bases
for those things anymore as a defense as I saw as an
independent cause of action.
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH
a Utah Banking Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.;
MICHAEL R, KEHL; GLORIA F. KEHL
LEONORE F. KEHL; KEITH KEHL;
KAREN SUE KEHL AND JOHN DOES
1through 10,

ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO PLAINTIFF ON COMPLAINT
CASE NO. 900901153

Defendants

TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.;
MICHAEL R. KEHL; GLORIA F. KEHL
LENORE F. KEHL; KEITH KEHL;
KAREN SUE KEHL,
Counterelaimants
vs.
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH
a Utah Banking Corporation,
Counterclaim
Defendant

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the entire
complaint (partial in the sense that issues remained on the
counterclaim) was argued on and taken under advisement. The
court now rules as follows: QCX *3 1992.
1. Consistent with the findings in the previous order filed
July 16, 1992, the court finds no material issues with respect to
the October 7, 1985 transaction and grants summary judgment on
the first and second claims for relief in the complaint, for the

amounts claimed therein and set forth in plaintiff's motion for
partial summary judgment dated August 13, 1992, except for the
issue of attorney's fees.
2. With respect to claims three and four, summary judgment
is granted to plaintiff on all issues relating to the February
10, 1987 loan except for the issues involving defendant's seventh
defense, improper disbursement of loan funds, which will be
tried, as well as the issue of attorney's fees.
3. Summary judgment is granted to plaintiff on claims five,
six, and seven, except for the issue of attorney's fees,
Dated this

15

I cJ of Nov

ROBERT F. OWENSV JudgeT5y Appointment
Fifth District Court
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
day of November, 1992, a
true and correct copy of the within and foregoing ORDER GRANTING
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF ON COMPLAINT was mailed,
first-class postage prepaid to Charles C. Brown, Jeffrey B.
Brown, and Budge W. Call, BROWN & BROWN, Attorneys for Defendants
and Counter claimants, 505 East 200 South, Ste 400, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84102 AND Thomas Higbee, CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE,
Attorneys for Plaintiff, 250 South Main Street, P.O.Box 72 6,
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0726*

^ .4/A£X^
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IRON, STATE OF UTAH
HON. ROBERT F. OWENS, judge

STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 900901153

vs.
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

(Tape-Recorded Proceedings)
REPORTERS TRIAL TRANSCRIPT
Thursday, December 10, 1992
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:
For the Plaintiff:

CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
BY: THOMAS M. HIGBEE, ESQ.
250 South Main Street
Cedar City, Utah 84720

For the Defendants:

BROWN & BROWN
BY: BUDGE W. CALL, ESQ.
505 East 200 South
Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
P.O. BOX 1534
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770
(801) 673-5315

5
MR. HIGBEE:
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:
say

Okay.

Unless Mr. Call wants to —

Your Honor, may I have my
Oh, I'm sorry.

—

Did you want to

—
MR. CALL: A brief statement.
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. CALL:

I just wanted to —

light of the prior ruling —

to state that in

rulings by this court on the

partial motions for summary judgment, all the defendants7
defenses have been dismissed other than their fourth
defense for the disbursement of one loan for $60,000 that
was made in February of 1987. And the purpose of the
February,. 1987 loan —

the 60,000 —

the defendants fail.

And we still maintain those two (Inaudible) the financial
situation of Troy, which was created by the bank in the
disbursement of the initial loan of $325,000. The
defendants still maintain that they're entitled to their
defenses as to the initial loan of 325, and if those
defenses would not have been dismissed by the Court, they
would be here today to testify as to those defenses.
Today, however, the issues are limited as we
discussed to the disbursement of one of many loans. And I
feel the evidence today will show that the funds on the
$60,000 loan were not disbursed in accordance with
settlement statements and sheets that were —

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

that were

6
1

I signed by —

by Troy in filing,

2

|

3

I is only a small bit of the evidence of the course of

The evidence that's to be presented here today

4

conduct of the bank and their dealings with Troy which we

5

feel and maintain support our other defenses that have been

6

improperly dismissed by the Court on summary judgment.

7

That's all I have, Your Honor.

8

THE COURT: All right.

9

You may call your first

witness.

10

MR. HIGBEE:

11

If you would stand up, and Susette will swear

12

Call Mr. LeLand Fife, Your Honor.

you, and you will take the witness chair.

13
14

LELAND O. FIFE,

15

the witness herein, having been

16

first duly sworn, was examined

17

and testified as follows:

18

THE WITNESS: Yes.

19
20

DIRECT EXAMINATION

21

BY MR. HIGBEE:

22

Q.

State your name.

23

A.

LeLand 0. Fife.

24

Q.

Where do you reside, Mr. Fife?

A.

St. George, Utah.

25

I

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

38
1

know —

2

that, but it was mainly for working capital*

3

were expanding their operation and needed working capital.

4

They found their income was somewhat seasonal, and they

5

needed this for sort of a bridge loan for working capital.

6
7

Q.

For —

they

Isn't it true that they had lost some of their

cash flow because of the delays on the 325 and the —
MR. HIGBEE:

8
9

I don't have the purpose of the sum in my notes on

Your Honor.

I think —

I'm going to object at this point,
I've sort of let it go to —

10

think he's too far afield here.

11

my technical objection is relevance.

but I

I don't see how — well,

THE COURT: Well, in view of the Court's

12
13

previous rulings, this would seem on the surface to relate

14

to the original loan.

15

What is the relevance to the remaining issue of

16

disbursement of the 60,000 loan?

17

MR. CALL:

I'm trying to get —

I'm trying to

18

get the parties' understanding on the disbursement of the

19

$60,000 loan.

20

THE COURT: Well, at this point until I see how

21

that understanding is related to the questions that you are

22

now asking, I'll sustain the objection.

23

MR. CALL: Okay.

24
25

Q.

Isn't it true that the reason you loaned the

$40,000 was to satisfy Mike Kehl on the previous loan?

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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May 7 ,

Jack H. Carpenter
292 West 1000 North
Cedar City, Utah 84720
(801) 586-4522

1985

*^8&
Lee F i f e
State Bank of Southern Utah
Cedar City, Utah
84720

Dear

M r . Fife,

At your request, and for the purpose of estimating
market value of the property known a s :
Troy Hygro
NewCastle,

the

fair

System
Utah

I have made a thorough investigation and
p e r t a i n i n g to value as reported h e r e i n .

analysis

The property rights appraised herein
D e t a i l s are as shown in the attached

are the Fee
report.

In my o p i n i o n , the Fair Market
a b o v e , as of May 3, 1985, i s :

of

Five Hundred Sixty
$562,000.00

Value

Two

of matters

Simple.

the property

Thousand

described

Dollars

I certify that I have no i n t e r e s t , present or contemplated,
in the property and that neither the employment to make
the a p p r a i s a l , nor the c o m p e n s a t i o n , is contingent on the
value of the property.
I have p e r s o n a l l y inspected the
p r o p e r t y and according to my k n o w l e d g e and belief, all
s t a t e m e n t s and information in this report are true and
c o r r e c t , subject to the u n d e r l y i n g assumption and contingent
c o n d i t i o n s stated.

p e c t f ulJ*y submitted,
acK

JC/jrc

H. Carpenter,

CA-S

TabG

THOMAS M. HIGBEE (1484)
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
250 South Main Street
P.O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
(801) 586-4404
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH,
a Utah Banking Corporation,
Plaintiff,

)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
LEE FIFE

vs.
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.;
MICHAEL R. KEHL; GLORIA F.
KEHL; DONALD K. KEKL;
LENORE F. KEKL; KEITH KEHL;
KAREN SUE KEKL and
JOHN DOES 1 through 10,

i Civil No. 90CSG1153
i Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendants.
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.;
MICHAEL R. KEHL; GLORIA F.
KEHL; LENORE F. KEHL; KEITH
KEHL; KAREN SUE KEHL,

]
]

Counterclaimants,
vs.

;

STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH,
a Utah Banking Corporation,

]
]

Counterclaim
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON )

]
]

LEE

FIFE, being

first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and

states as follows:
1.

This affiant is an individual currently residing in St.

George, Washington County, State of Utah.
2.

At all times relevant to this case, this affiant was a

vice-president of State Bank of Southern Utah and was the bank
officer designated to deal with the Troy Hygro loans which are at
issue in these proceedings.
3.

This

affiant was personally

involved

in each of the

conversations, communications, and other matters outlined in this
affidavit, and thus this affidavit is made upon this affiantfs
personal knowledge.
4.
the

This affiant was initially approached by Troy Hygro, for

purpose

of

arranging

financing,

for

the

construction

of

greenhouses operated near New Castle in western Iron County.
5.

After a few meetings with Troy Hygro representatives,

primarily

Jim

consummation

Markell, the parties
of

a

financing

began

working

arrangement.

Early

towards the
on

in

the

process, the initial plans changed in that originally Troy Hygro
was only going to borrow enough money to finance the construction
of additional greenhouses on property already
Christensen.
enough

Along

for both

the

the

line, it became

construction

of

the

leased from Boyd

necessary

to finance

greenhouses and the

purchase of the property from Christensen.

The final loan figure

was

the

$3 25,000,

which

included

funds

for

property and construction of the greenhouses.

2

purchase of

the

6.

Between the date of the initial contact, as outlined

above, and the date the loan was actually completed, the parties
worked together, in the usual and customary manner, to complete
the loan package*
obtained

The parties gathered financial information,

appraisals

on

the property, worked

out

easement and

title questions, and similar things.
7.

As

with

any

loan, neither

of

the

parties

to

this

transaction were bound until the papers were actually signed and
the funds disbursed.

Neither myself, nor any other officer at

State Bank to my knowledge, ever promised, committed or affirmed
in any

way

that

the

loan would

in

fact be

granted, nor any

specific date when the funds would be advanced.
8.

In

the

banking

industry,

absent

a

firm

commitment

letter, loans are preliminary until the documents are acutally
signed and the funds advanced.
which

need

to be

satisfied

Many times there are conditions

right up to the date of closing.

Since the borrower is never bound to complete the loan, the bank
considers

the

loans

to

be

preliminary

until

the

funds

are

actually advanced.
9.

In this case, Troy Hygro was never bound to complete the

loan until the actual signature of the documents and advancement
of the funds.
10.

Some time after July 1985, the pressure to get the loan

completed increased.

State Bank was aware of Troy Hygro1s needs,

and moved the loan process forward as quickly as possible.

The

loan package was submitted to the Small Business Administration
3

of the United States Government (the "SBA") for approval, which
all parties knew was a condition to completing the loan.
11.

SBA authorization was received in writing on September

3, 1985.

However, by the time the SBA authorization was given,

State Bank had other existing loans outstanding up to the maximum
allowed

by

Therefore,

the
State

regulatory
Bank

could

limits
not

governing

immediately

State

lend

Bank.

the

funds

pursuant to the SBA approval.
12.

As soon as I notified Jim Markell that: the S3A approval

had been given, but that State Bank did not have sufficient funds
to lend, I encouraged him to seek financing elsewhere.

I gave

him thp SBA approval and gave him the names of other banks thar
may be able to complete the SBA loan.

S3A approvals are readily

assignable and can be used through any appropriately

regulated

bank.
13.

During

the

negotiation

process,

from

the

initial

contact in February of 1985 to the time of the SBA approval on
September 3, 1985, State Bank did not know it would be out of
money

when

the

SBA

approval

was

granted.

Obviously,

institution's lending ability varies from time to time.

the

It was

not until approximately 30 days prior to September 3, 1985 that
the Bank's lending ability became tight.
14.
strained,

Even
this

after

the

Bank's

affiant hoped

that

financial

situation

when

SBA

the

granted it would be in a position to lend the funds.

4

became

approval

was

Since I did

not know when the SBA would be given and since I did not know
what other loans were
until

the

actual

in process, I did not know

day

of

the

SBA

approval

for certain

what

the

Bank's

financial situation would be on the date the approval was given.
15.

As soon as the SBA approval was given, and it became

apparent that there were no funds available
Bank

moved

as

quickly

Within approximately
investor

for

the

as

it could

to

to advance, State

remedy

the

situation.

30 days State Bank was able to locate an

loan, and

the

loan was

closed

on or about

October 7, 1985.
16.

Even though the Bank was not able to fund this loan as

quickly as either the Bank or Troy Hyqro wanted, there was never
a time when State Bank was not doing its best to get the loan
completed.

In

loans

like

this,

it

is

impossible

commitment as to when the loan will be granted.
many

variable

case,

that,

factors, such as those coming
absent

a

commitment

to make a

There are so

to light in this

letter,

loans

are

not

obligations of either party until they are completed.
17.

Some time in 1986 Troy Hygro began to experience cash

flow problems and approached State Bank for an additional loan.
To remedy the cash flow shortage, on February 10, 1987, State
Bank loaned an additional $60,000 to Troy Hygro.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT.
DATED this

Ak6]'day

of March, 1992.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

Jr"

1992.
Notary Pub<Jn.c • ''
My Commission Expires:
Residing At:

:c
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF LEE FIFE to Budge W. Call at BROWN
& BROWN, 505 East 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 by first
class mail, postage fully prepaid on this
1992.

Secretarv

7

fe

t/~ day of March,
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(ShA)
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12S South State .Street

W»o/ Ciffcu'/icnicnl O/Wy

Salt Lake City, Utah 0-113^
londmr (Nam« one/ Addrtti

ltt%Sr>«» , ifil«on

jll T i§**tt /

pnrr"

• tmlvd* VP Cocr)
Coin*..

State BonkoC Sou/hern Utah
26 North Kiln
Cedar C i t y r UUOi 04720

ASM

lc*m >Win n^n>

Borrower (Norm)

i

SO

i - 2 7-87.

AiM-ynf of f/oi# J

T r e y rry*jjT>-$/tfUin«j,

4096 Hlglniuy HS
East Troy, Wis.

§

t.Solvrily Dal* (IMS)
AIM ' W , ,*vetf
Subioqvcnl Ofiborscmanf
ArrtoVnf $«L29^9,flfl-JDlOL

n„i,?

2-20-87

D o f t ©/ N o U ; _ J b ] I b H 1 2 S .

60^)00.^02

Inc/
le«^*r Cc^ptfMi «nlorci# on

^fifl

t/oy 6oi/s

53120

For the purpose of inducing SBA, directly or itnltr'CtU lo participate , n • " ) * a * » n ihis ^ a n l n « Borrower, nilh knowledge
of the provisions of 10 U.5.C. 1001 and 15 U.S C nl.V%ln«li p. mid? certain criminal penalties for mnking fnlje iliilcmenls*
acknowledges receipt of I
29*990.09..
oh
l-Jlu.20,.1987.
""d certifies (1) llial llic proceeds of
lint disbursement * i l l be and ail p r e " " " * dbbur •«•!!» *nt' h j \ * l»-*rn u*.cd, in accuid.mce with the Loan Authorization, (2) that
there ha* beett no substantial ml vers'' cluing? in tit- Jmrocnl t«*tvtit* n, ot£-muntti>it, operation*, or fixed ei*Ct9, since the
application for this loan was filed nrt'h'or siiht*'|ii'tii in tl.r p i c i i / " j ' d i ' b u i f o n r n l and (3) that there arc.ho Hcn« or encunv
branccs against the rc.il or personal pfopciU s c u r m c *-»id h>n rxc % rt ih?:.e rrfcrred to hi\4 disclosed tu Uie application for
this loan.
•'
Ltndtr certifies lhat disbursement »f the l»wn pr#»« ruU »%i« m« I? <•••"* I n * t>in pio.*»»*«h *«r»» u v d 01 * H fnrlli below mid in
accordance * i l h the prmisious of il»c l e w A I M I " - M i i i * . i i* «• 1 ^ rj±'t'U1
,n9*i* c ^ ' r * J *s o>i»<l* djjtfou, escpt diccks for tosh
operating topitaU «i$h, lo rrimoicv lu*rrcu<r y V ci ••/ vtJ ««,—•• .»«/..'• • '••!••> */i*r I C A I <t,*pro%al a wc/or jurA cm 1 homed UJC of
"VtcctU, or oi ylhcrwttr directed by ihtJLoajjJui'tw
w%*i. *>\>l •l..-.t »rr.«tnicii<vn p.n«? Tor wiiK"lo%n pioceeds as iSTeu'lieluto Urn
btten conipieieiL (Any clcviuilcn ftom tl»r I ^an \ u i ' i f i . »i» MI H«J*I U I * • m l i f i . r ' l m ^ r i i m ^ bj SOA prior lo ctpenditure of
the loan funds.)
3 H
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Application sul>p.r«grAp)i

2-b

mmm,
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-To further induce SUA to pulictpitc h» il"* \OM%% /.-:.- # i r r i i f i - j ilo* nriihrr the /.••f/cr nor il^ officers, agents* affiliates %tf
atlorr ) j , have or will chare/:, or receive, din*ctl> «?r tsidtrr'tl). am b?nu*. fc»*. c ^ i n f t m i c n , or other payment or benefit, or,
require a compensating balance, Cciiifi«-aic of nrpr*»ii 01 t»ili*r scrurii) in e?nnc:ti.Mi with making or servicing of litis loan *
except as may bo specifically permitted by the Lean Nuihormihoii. 5?MA trrulations or the SBA Torm 750 "Cuarnnty Agreement."

htndtr and Borrower herrtby certify that no feci Ui\r h-cn or vJH \r. pjid, d.rcetK 01 indirectly, other limn those reported on
SDA Forms 4 or 159 "Compensation Agreement." It is 'indcrstood that all fees not approved by SBA arc prohibited.

lencV

terowef

niy»YTtiS'n,o-r.Y:ntM3t wc.
lly_
UAtfl.

rrb.Uo. 19^7'

This Certification must be signed and returned In i*»e £11 \ immt Juicly after <AC\* ili>hui>vmenl. I f a large number of checks,
.Itemize on Separate sheets, st'en and attach hcret%i

Whoovcr-,rnt\kes any atatement knowing it to br fil«c. or u|,r,#.vcr uillrnll) o u r v a i u r ^ ony securtty, for lira purpose or
obtaining for himself or for an applicant an> loan, or f Mcnsion thereof by renewal, deferment or action, or otherwise*
or;fni acceptance, release* or substitution of srcuiity thcrclor, ot for the purpose of influencing in any-way t h o ~ ~ ' \
icilon of.'the 5BAi or for the purpose pt obtnining mnnc), property or invlhing of viilun, tinder tlje Small Buslneit Act
is amended, shall be punished under the provisions of IB U 5.C. U*9l and/or IS U.S.C. 6*15, by fifie o r n o ( mo|rc I M M
$5,000'or by imprisonment for not more than t^o )eats. or both.
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»Hlii5M«lll SMCCI
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Troy Hy^ro-yvstcn.-?, Inc.
4096 Hlyliway KS
East Troy, Wis.
53UO

Dolt of Mafai

3..1A-.Q7

f.fl T Oi in. PP.

le*^er Computet •nft'tff on

SCO

c/oy bosrs

For I he purpose of inducing SDA. duertl) or in-lirccll\ lo J M I I K J J . I I C in a m w.i) in litis loan (lie Uorrower, with knowlcdgo
of the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. G l f y liich f ' o - i J r certain criminal penalties for making false statements,
acknowltdgc70/secipt of l _ 3 j ) , 1 D J U 1 0
"h
TV.C. l r > , J ^ G .
*"<* certifies (1) that the proceeds of
litis disbursement will be and all pio\ious disbtiMcmrnis h a t * U r n w e d , in nccoHnnee with ilic Loan Authorization, (2) that
Ultra has been no substantial advene change in the financial condition, ergamrahen, operations, or fixed essots, since the
application for tin? loan * t s filed and/or MIIKC'IUCHI in ih<« pi C M Mi' di'lttH«rm»itt, and (3) tlint llicrc aie'no Hens or eneunv
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this loan.
Lender certifies tlinl duhursenirnl of tin* l*t*n pr» i r n l % . j * ntadr .m*l ihr tain pf'j~u*ds * t ' i c iMi'd n i art fnrtli bclo* and In
Accordance >*illi the provisions of tlie Lsan Aulh-'tir •!••••• 1) •• i.. i»i of jot it tn\tc (tick* ns dt tailed be IOH, excrnt checks fur cash
operating enpitnt, cow, to reimburse heron c far rn»/»*i.-» I cI/II*I«:I;I.«C« «in#/e aft" Aim nn/imio/ d'tte /or Jiir/i authorized use of
proceeds, or as otneruisc directed h> the j o i n 1»I/ 1 I«-»'I:.I"IM ami tint «iin«lrii7iion']iii«I7or~Hith loan proceeds as liMcdTJcJow"hos
ccn compicted. ( A n ) deviation from liie Coc»n A . I I I H M I / . I I . n m u x i.. aut(ic-ru*;d in ^ n h u g b> SUA prior to expenditure of

ilic loan funds.)
See Paragropb^
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Application subpaipgrnph

, of Auit**jn:jti?*i " I sc -?f Pi > " • «l^ "
N«mc of r « \ e c
AM. >»mt of Tat in**!*!
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M-K P i | « Co.
T\rrr/ Hy/io-5^r.tMr^

M
w
H

"

Diite of Pa) mcnl

*'1,».»00.00
l fooo.o;
ft,000.CO
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Purposo

K:«:avatlon V^irk
ftciterialo
Pipo & MD tor In \B
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Misc. f'atcrioJs *
Defenses

To further induct SOA lo participate in the loan. Letder certifies l i n t neither ilic Lender not its officers, agents, affiliatoa or
altorne/s« have or will charge, or rccci\c, direct!) or indirertl). •••• *
'*••. mrnmission, or oilier payment or benefit, or
require a compensating balance. Certificate of Deposit or olh»*t
• lion with ranking or servicing of this loan
except i t may be spcclflcoll) permitted by the Loan A i i t h c t i * ' "
• •t.iimni or the SUA Form 750 #f Gttariinly Agrnemcnl.'

Lttidtr and narrower hcrrhy r.cttify that no frcs ha%r been or %»ill hi piid. i l n r r i l ) or indirectly, other than thoie reported on
SUA Forms 4 or 159 ,, Compcn«.ilion Agrrrmeni." It is t i n d c i f l o r l i l u i all trr< mil .ippro%rd h> SUA arr prnhihiloil.

H*no~of

ltnc/ff

ggaOVLir/CBT, V tj ;V'?r. ? ^ j ^ g x -

p...

f r i , . i n . 10(17

Dale^.^r, /•'), /ft^L

ThliCertificHon must be Hgncd «!»d returned to the SUA Jmm«.l.»icly • » « ' « « h diiburiemenl. I f . lerge number of checki,
lumUe en t<par,l« shotU, fign end ettach heicio.

« • *m*nfl
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STATE RAXKOF SOUTHERN UTAH
26 North Man

•

Cedar oty, uca>> 34720

•

(SO'.) 535-3456

February 20, 1937

Troy Kygrc-Systens, Inc.
4 06~ Highly ES
Ease Troy, tfis. 53120
Attention:

Gloria Kehl

Dear Gloria:
r e l i e v i n g i s a breakdown on the 560,000.00 SBA guaranteed lean:

- s p c s i t e d to azzz. in
Cedar Citv
Paid Lean"-49359-2
Paid Loan -5077^-2
lean 7<BZS

Total

4,?::.00
17,766.59
15,113.15

( P r m c . 17,294.35 •«• Ir.t. $432.24)
( ? r m c . 15,000.00 T I " . Silc.15)

1 279.00

$£:.»:;:.co

The lean fees consisted of tne relieving:
Title ;:ork - S154.00
Kez. L Pel. 50.00
Appraisal
65.00
UCC Filings 10.00
Lien Search 10.00
Postage
30.00
Guaranty fee
960.00
(This fee is charged by SEA and is 2% of the
30* c\^Lrar.taed portion)
Enclosed are several documents that need co be signed and returned to us.
SBA Kote showing the change in die payment ejsount frou ?996.00 to S1004.00,
Condensation Agreement to be signed and returned
Settlement Sheet to be signed and returned
Authorization & Loan Agreement (photo copy is for your file)
Federal Debt Collection Policies Form to be signed and returned.
If you have any questions about this please call me.
Yours truly,
<

^

Bernice Rember
SBA Loan Secretary
enc.

Tab J

1 2 4 6 - 1 2 5 2 Wash.

824 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

briefing falls far below the high standards
of professionalism of the firm in question
and we do not expect such errors will be
repeated. Nevertheless, in this instance,
the briefing errors wasted the time of opposing counsel and hampered the work of
the court Accordingly, the violations of
the rules will not go unnoticed and unsanctioned.
AGED and BAKER, JJ., concur.

Editor's Note: The opinion of the
Washington Court of Appeals in
Anderson v. Texxann Industries, Inc.,
published in the advance sheet at this
citation, 824 P.2d 1246-1252, was withdrawn from the bound volume at the
request of the Court
64 WashApp. 401
jjpiSEATTLE FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
N A , a national banking association,
Respondent and Cross Appellant,
v.
James R. SIEBOL and Patricia D.
Siebol, husband and wife, d/b/a
Pourhouse Tavern, Appellants,
and Bleyhl Farm Service, Inc^ an Oregon
corporation; State of Washington Department of Employment Security; and
State of Washington Department of
Revenue, Defendants.
No. 10961-5-m.
Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 3.
Feb. 25, 1992.
Lender brought foreclosure action
against borrowers seeking recovery on
loans secured by borrowers' real property.
Borrowers counterclaimed for damages allegedly resulting from lender's breach of
ils oral promise to provide improvement
and inventory financing for borrowers1

used automobile dealership. The Superior
Court, Yakima County, Heather Van Nuys,
J., granted foreclosure, granted borrowers
equitable setoff for lost profits, and limited
recoupment of lost profits to first year of
operation. Lender and borrowers appealed. The Court of Appeals, Shields, CJ.,
held that (1) statute of limitation on borrowers' counterclaim was not tolled under
continuing relationship doctrine; (2) borrowers were entitled to equitable offset;
(3) damage award representing borrowers'
lost profits was supported by evidence;
and (4) lender was entitled to award of
attorneys fees.
Affirmed.
1. Limitation of Actions <s=>46(6)
"Continuing relationship doctrine/'
which tolls statute of limitation on claims
by clients against professionals until professional relationship is terminated, did not
apply to claim by borrower against lender
for damages allegedly resulting from lender's breach of its oral promise to provide
inventory financing for borrower's used car
dealership.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Limitation of Actions «=>40(1)
Statutes of limitation never run
against defenses arising out of transactions sued upon.
3. Limitation of Actions *»41
Defense of recoupment is not barred
by statute of limitation so long as main
action itself is timely; defense goes to justice of plaintiffs claim and, although no
affirmative judgment can be had, recoupment is available as defense even when
barred as affirmative cause of action.
4. Mortgages *»415(1)
Borrowers were entitled to assert lender's alleged breach of oral promise to provide financing as affirmative defense in
action by lender to recover on loans secured by borrowers' real property where
borrowers entered into loan agreement
based upon loan officer's representation
that loan would include amounts for purchase of inventory, borrowers leased land
and spent $60,000 on improvements based

SEATTLE FIRST NAT. BANK, N.A. v. SIEBOL

Wash. 1253
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upon oral loan commitment, and borrowers
acted in part based upon previous course of
dealings between borrowers and lender.
5. Estoppel <*=>85
Lost profits are recoverable in promissory estoppel cases as long as there is
substantial and sufficient factual basis supporting amount awarded; fact that business is new does not preclude recovery for
lost profits if they may be reasonably estimated through market condition analysis of
similar, but profitable, businesses in vicinity, operating under substantially same conditions.
6. Damages e»190
Borrowers established lost profits resulting from lender's breach of oral commitment to loan borrowers funds for used
automobile dealership; expert witnesses
for both lender and borrowers testified regarding borrowers' actual losses, national
industry averages, and local used automobile dealerships, both experts were certified
public accountants who used similar methods, and court's lost profits award was
between projections of two experts.
7. Damages «=>190
Decision to limit lost profits damages
for breach of oral loan commitment to one
year was supported by evidence that lender's extension of credit to borrowers, in
form of secured note amortized on 15-year
schedule, was subject to annual review, and
that note was technically due in one year.
8. Costs «=>194.16
Attorney fees may be awarded only
when authorized by private agreement,
statute, or recognized ground of equity.
9. Bills and Notes <*=>534
Costs «=>194^2
Mortgages *»377, 581(2)
Lender was entitled to award of attorney fees in action against borrowers to
collect under terms of promissory notes,
mortgages, security interests, and deeds of
trust, where those documents expressly
provided for costs of collection, including
attorney fees, even though borrowers were
1. Mr. Siebol operated a used car lot in Union
*Gap during the 1960*s and had maintained his
license ever since, keeping a few used cars for

awarded equitable offset against lender's
recovery based upon lender's breach of oral
promise.
l4oaJohn J. Carroll, John S. Moore, Velikanje, Moore & Shore, Yakima, for appellants.
Don W. Schussler, Halverson & Applegate, Yakima, for respondent and cross
appellant
SHIELDS, Chief Judge.
Seattle First National Bank (Seafirst) instituted foreclosure proceedings to recover
on secured loans it made to James R. and
Patricia D. Siebol. After a bench trial, the
court entered judgment for Seafirst in the
amount of $431,858.49 plus interest, $50,000 in attorney fees, $106.20 in costs, and
foreclosed the deeds of trust securing the
debt However, the court granted the Siebols an offset of $34,364 in damages resulting from Mr. Siebol's detrimental reliance
on the bank's promise to provide financing
for lot improvement and purchase of inventory for a new business venture. The Siebols appeal the amount of the offset and
the award of attorney fees; the bank crossappeals the award of the offset and its
amount We affirm.
Late in 1982, Mr. Siebol decided to reenter the used car business in Yakima.1
His assets consisted of the Pourhouse Tavern in Yakima, a seller's contract on the
Caribou Motel in Oroville, a Circle-L gas
station/minimart in Sunnyside and adjacent
6- and 60-acre ranches in the Yakima area.
He later acquired a contract on a 35-acre
leased orchard.
Mr. Siebol had banked with Seafirst since
1977 and loan officer Terry Wheat had
been handling his accounts since April
1982. In January 1983, Mr. Siebol met
with Mr. Wheat to discussfinancingfor his
proposed dealership. Mr. Siebol represented he would need $50,000 for improvements
to the lot he planned to lease and $250,000
for used car ^inventory. There are variations in the testimony of both Mr. Wheat
and Mr. Siebol regarding the total amount
the bank would loan Mr. Siebol; however,
sale at a Circle-L gas staaon/minimart he
owned.
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the two pages of the bank's records whichi
possibly could resolve the issue are miss-r
ing. The court found Mr. Wheat represent-;ed to Mr. Siebol that he could obtain loans8
for him in those amounts, either as flooring?
and/or a line of credit,2 and that thoses
loans would be in addition to approximatelyF
$117,000 which Mr. Siebol owed the bank att
that time. Relying on Mr. Wheat's assur-•"
ances, Mr. Siebol proceeded with necessaryf
lot improvements and opened his used carr
business in April 1983.
At approximately the same time, Mr.
Wheat submitted a flooring plan to the*
bank department in Seattle which handled1
that type of financing. On April 18, 1983,
,
Mr. Siebol signed a master note for a creditt
line not to exceed $244,000, including thes
existing $117,799.77 debt which was rolled1
over into the note. As security, the bank:
took an assignment of the Caribou Motel1
contract and deed, and a first mortgage on1
the Pourhouse Tavern.
After the car lot opened, Mr. Wheat in-formed Mr. Siebol the bank would not floor*
his used car inventory, nor would it extend1
an additional line of credit Although Mr.
Wheat indicated he would continue trying
to obtainfinancingfor him, the court foundl
Mr. Siebol knew in May 1983 he would not:
be receiving the entire amount promised1
for lot improvement and used car invento-'
ry. The court further found Mr. SiebolI
received an additional $115,000 through ad-vances used to cover overdrafts,3 for ai
total of $359,000. "In effect, [Mr. Siebol]I
never received $58,000.00 of the fundst
[$417,000] he believed were to be made
available to him in April, 1983", and which
he reasonably anticipated.
On April 16, 1984, Mr. Siebol's $244,000|
credit line and overdrafts were rolled over
into a new secured $309,000 t4osnote and a
new unsecured $50,000 note. Payments on
the secured note were amortized on a 15year schedule subject to an annual review,
but the note was technically due in 1 year.
Additional security was taken in the form
of a second mortgage on the Circle-L gas
station/minimart and an assignment of the

Circle-L lease proceeds. Ultimately, Seafirst held a security interest in all of the
Siebols' real property.
From July 1987, Mr. Siebol was unable to
make his loan payments to Seafirst In
October, Seafirst supervisory personnel in
Spokane directed Mr. Wheat to make written demand on the Siebols for payment of
the $378,312.12 then owed plus $10,338.70
in interest Mr. Wheat did so by letter
dated October 16, 1987, demanding payment in full by October 22. Seafirstfileda
summons and complaint for foreclosure on
November 24. The Siebols counter-claimed
for damages, including lost profits, allegedly resulting from the bank's breach of its
oral promise to provide $300,000 in improvement and inventory financing. They
also asserted the breach as an affirmative
defense.
The case was tried October 9-11, 1989,
with additional proceedings on the issue of
damages on November 1,1989 and January
2, 1990. The Siebols did not challenge the
foreclosure, which the court granted.
Most of the trial involved the Siebols' counterclaim and affirmative defense. The
court ruled the counterclaim for affirmative relief was barred by the statute of
limitation, but granted an equitable setoff
on the affirmative defense for lost profits
on a theory of promissory estoppel. The
court limited recoupment of lost profits to
the first year of operation because the extension of credit would have been reviewable at the end of that period and the bank
could have refused to renew it
Four issues are presented by the appeal
and cross appeal:
(1) Whether Mr. Wheat's ongoing efforts
to obtain additional financing for the Siebols tolled the statute of limitation on their
counterclaim under the continuing relationship doctrine;
14oe(2) Whether the court's equitable offset based upon a theory of promissory estoppel was appropriate;
(3) Whether the court erred in awarding
the Siebols $34,364 for lost profits; and

2. The local branch could not approve dealer
flooring, but could approve a line of credit
The finding implies the loan was not contingent
on flooring approval.

3. Mr. Siebol was permitted to overdraft his account as an interim form of financing the purchase of additional inventory while Mr. Wheat
tried to arrange additional funding.
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(4) Whether the court erred in awarding
attorney fees to the bank.

and realistically cannot be expected to
question and assess the techniques employed or the manner in which the servicSIEBOLS' COUNTERCLAIM
es are rendered.
The bank started foreclosure proceedings (Citation omitted.)
on November 24, 1987. On January 11,
[1] The Siebols argue the ongoing rela1988, the Siebols asserted their countertionship
in this case fits within the purpose
claim based on the bank's alleged breach of
of
the
doctrine.
The Hermann case apan oral promise to provide inventory financplied
the
discovery
rule to allegations of
ing. The bank argued the statute of limitation barred the counterclaim; the court stockbroker malpractice and seemed to acagreed. The Siebols concede the 3-year cept, without explanation or elaboration,
limitation in RCW 416.080 applies to the that a continuing relationship could toll the
counterclaim because Mr. Siebol knew in statute of limitation. See Herrhann, at
May 1983 thefinancingoriginally promised 628, 630. It did not involve bank loans.
was not forthcoming. However, they seek Nor do we find any cases from other jurisan affirmative judgment exceeding Seaf- dictions which have applied the doctrine to
irstfs claim, contending they fit within the a situation involving a commercial bank
"continuous relationship" doctrine which loan officer and a customer. We decline
tolls the statute of limitation untfl the rela- the invitation to adopt or extend the doctionship between the parties is terminated. trine to these facts.
Hermann v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
& Smith, Inc., 17 WashApp. 626, 564 P.2d
4
[2,3] The Siebols also raised the bank's
817 (1977) and cases from other jurisdicalleged breach of an oral promise as an
tions.
Washington cases do not directly address affirmative defense. Statutes of limitation
the continuing relationship doctrine. Other never run against defenses arising out of
jurisdictions have held it applies to doctors, the transactions sued upon. Allis-Chalattorneys, dentists, architects, accountants, mers Corp. v. North Bonneville, 113
surveyors, executors and investment advis- Wash.2d 108, 112, 775 P.2d 953 (1989).
ors whenuwthe professional relationship is One such defense, recoupment, is not
a continuing one. The purpose of the doc- barred by the statute of limitation so long
trine is discussed in Greene v. Greene, 56 as the main action itself is timely. 51
N.Y.2d 86, 451 N.Y.S.2d 46, 436 N.E.2d 496 AmJur.2d Limitation of Actions § 77, at
(1982). Greene, 451 N.Y.S. at 50, 436 656 (1970). The defense goes to the justice
N.E.2d at 500, notes the doctrine was first of the plaintiffs claim, and although no
recognized in medical malpractice cases, affirmative judgment can be had, recoupthen extended to other professionals and ment is available as a defense even when
barred as an affirmative cause of action.
also applied to equitable claims:
In a broader sense the rule recognizes 20 AmJur.2d Counterclaim, Recoupment,
that a person seeking professional assist- and Setoff §§ 10 and 11, at 235-36 (1965).
ance has a right to repose confidence in
[4] UosHere, the court rejected the Siethe professional's ability and good faith, bols' suggestion Mr. Wheat's oral promise
4. In Hermann, the plaintiffs argued the 3-year
statute of limitation on their claim against a
stockbroker for negligence and mishandling of
their accounts was tolled and did not begin to
run until the date the relationship between the
parties was terminated, premised on the fact the
relationship between the parties was a continuing one. Hermann, at 628, 564 P.2d 817. Without comment on the continuing relationship
doctrine, Hermann held at page 630, 564 P.2d
817:
The determination of the exact date that the
plaintiffs discovered the defendants' wrongdo-

ing, or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have discovered such wrongdoing, is a
factual question for determination by the jury
and, likewise, if there is evidence to support
plaintiffs' claim that the relationship was a
continuing one so that the statute is tolled
until the relationship is terminated, is also a
factual question to be submitted to the jury on
proper instructions.
(Italics ours.)

1256

Wash

-

*24 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

constituted a contract to lend money,6 but
found the bank answerable on a theory of
promissory estoppel.
Promissory estoppel requires five elements: (1) A promise which (2) the promisor should reasonably expect to cause
the promisee to change his position and
(3) which does cause the promisee to
change his position (4) justifiably relying
upon the promise, in such a manner that
(5) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
Farm Crop Energy, Inc. v. Old Natl,
Bank, 38 Wash.App. 50, 52, 685 P.2d 1097
(1984) (quoting Corbit v. J.I. Case Co., 70
Washed 522, 539, 424 P.2d 290 (1967)),
rev'don other grounds, 109 Wash.2d 923,
750 P.2d 231 (1988).
The court's findings of fact upon which
the equitable remedy is based are supported by substantial evidence. The findings support the court's conclusion an equitable offset is warranted on the basis of
promissory estoppel. Mr. Wheat's representations constituted a promise upon
which he knew Mr. Siebol was relying.
Mr. Siebol leased a lot and spent $60,000 on
improvements based on the oral loan commitment; he would not have borrowed
money from Seafirst to open a new business had it not promised to finance his used
car inventory. Based on the parties'agreement and his previous course of dealings
with the bank, Mr. Siebol's change of position was justified and it would be unjust
not to enforce the promise.
LOST PROFITS
[5] Lost profits are recoverable in
promissory estoppel cases as long as there
is a substantial and sufficient factual basis
supporting the amount awarded. That the
business is new does not preclude recovery
for lost profits if they may be reasonably
estimated through market condition analysis of similar, but profitable, businesses in
the vicinity, operating under substantially
the same conditions. Farm Crop\^Ener5. Seafirst's arguments the court should have
concluded the alleged oral contract failed for
lack of certainty are, therefore, pointless.
6.« The court did not find a breach of a contract
to lend money, thus contract cases limiting

gy, 109 Wash.2d at 927-28, 685 P.2d 1097;
Larsen v. Walton Plywood Co., 65
Wash.2d 1, 11, 19, 390 P.2d 677, 396 P.2d
879 (1964).
[6] Here, the Siebols' expert provided a
framework using Mr. Siebol's actual losses
and national industry averages, while Seafirst's expert provided details regarding local businesses. Both experts are certified
public accountants who used similar methods: one arrived at a figure of $65,000, and
the other, a figure of $20,400. In the end,
the court fashioned an equitable remedy.*
The court's award is between the projections of the two experts; we will not disturb it
[7] The court's decision to limit damages to 1 year is supported by its finding
the extension of credit would have been
nonrevolving and reviewable at the end of
the first year. Substantial evidence supports the finding. The court's remedy is
equitable, which is the goal in a promissory
estoppel case.
ATTORNEY FEES
[8,9] The Siebols contend Seafirst
should not have been awarded attorney
fees because most of the trial focused on
their counterclaim and affirmative defense,
and the amount of the equitable offset
awarded as recoupment They argue Seafirst was not the prevailing party on the
issue of promissory estoppel: it did not
improve its position at trial and had an
offset judgment entered against it The
argument is without merit Attorney fees
may be awarded only when authorized by a
private agreement, statute, or a recognized
ground of equity. Clark v. Horse Racing
Comm'n, 106 Wash.2d 84, 720 P.2d 831
(1986). Pursuant to RCW 4.84.330, the prevailing party in an action to enforce or
defend a contract is entitled to attorney
fees and costs when the contract so provides. Seafirst sued to collect under the
terms of the Siebols' promissory notes,
mortgages, security interests, and deeds of
damages to expenses associated with making
another loan do not apply. See footnote 5 and
associated text Furthermore, the Siebols were
unable to obtain inventory financing elsewhere
due to the concentrated debt at Seafirst
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trust Those documents expressly provide
for costs Uioof collection including attorney
fees. The award of an equitable offset
does not make the Siebols a prevailing party entitled to fees under RCW 4.84.330.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
THOMPSON, J., and STAUFFACHER,
J., pro tern., concur.
( O | KEY NUMKR SYSTEM >

64 WashApp. 480
l48oSTATE of Washington, Respondent,
v.
Richard D. WEBB, Appellant
No. 25693-9-1.
Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 1.
March 2, 1992.
As Amended on Denial of Reconsideration
March 31, 1992.
Defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary and second-degree malicious
mischief, following jury trial in the Superior Court, Snohomish County, Richard T.
Thorpe, J., and defendant appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Pekelis, J., held that (1)
statement to police was not product of improper custodial interrogation; (2) error, if
any, in admitting testimony by wife as to
husband's statement was harmless; (3)
community property interest in property
damaged does not preclude prosecution for
malicious mischief; and (4) burglary and
malicious mischief offenses should have
been treated as constituting same criminal
conduct for purpose of computing offender
score under sentencing guidelines.
Conviction affirmed, and remanded for
resentencing.
1. Criminal Law «=>412.1(4)
Statement to police by custodial burglary defendant who had requested counsel

that the stuff he had damaged also belonged to him was not made in response to
improper interrogation, even though defendant's statement followed officer's alleged
response to defendant's question as to
whether booking him was necessary,
"You're damn right this is necessary. You
went in and vandalized (victim's) apartment"; officer's alleged statement was reasonable response to defendant's inquiry,
did not call for response from defendant,
and officer could not have known that his
alleged statement would elicit incriminating
response. tLS.CA. ConstAmend 5.
2. Criminal Law «=>412.2(3)
Constitutional proscription against
compelled self-incrimination requires that
any custodial interrogation of suspect be
preceded by advice that suspect has right
to presence of attorney. U.S.C.A. Const
Amend. 5.
3. Criminal Law e»41&2(4)
If custodial suspect requests attorney,
interrogation must cease until attorney is
present U.S.C.A. ConstAmend 5.
4. Witnesses e»188(l)
Marital testimonial privilege prevents
spouse from being examined as witness for
or against other spouse without consent of
other spouse. Wesf s RCWA 5.60.060(1).
5. Witnesses «=>192, 195
Marital communications privilege applies to confidential communications between spouses during marriage; to fall
within privilege, communication must have
been induced by marriage relationship, and
the privilege survives dissolution and
death. Wesf s RCWA 5.60.060(1).
6. Witnesses «=>53(3)
Statutory exception to marital communications privilege for statements regarding crime committed by one spouse against
the other is limited to cases where crime
committed against testifying spouse is one
of personal violence. West's RCWA 5.60.060(1).
7. Criminal Law C1170VX1)
Error in admitting wife's testimony of
husband's threats, in violation of marital
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her verbal and behavorial symptoms indicated she was in all probability a victim of
sexual abuse.25
Wanda Lairby's testimony did not reveal
that she was vindictive toward her ex-husband or that she harbored-any fear that
she would be unable to gain permanent
custody of her children. We conclude
there was substantial credible evidence
supporting defendants' convictions.
The verdicts below are affirmed.

sister appealed asserting that under California law the counterclaim was time
barred. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J.,
held that: (1) California law applied, and (2)
in absence of appropriate references to the
applicable law, that law would be presumed
to be the same as Utah law, and setoff
would be allowed up to the extent of claim
made, but no affirmative relief was allowed
on the time-barred counterclaim.
Reversed.

HALL, CJ., concurs.
STEWART and HOWE, JJ., concur in the
result
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate
herein.

1. Set-Off and Counterclaim <s=>2
California law governed outcome of
case involving offsetting claims on promissory notes where each note was executed
in California. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-45.
2. Bills and Notes «=>117
Legal effect of promissory notes is
governed by the law of the jurisdiction
where they are executed and delivered.

Joyce K. JACOBSEN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
•.

Lorna K. BUNKER and William
Frederick Rigby, Defendants
and Respondents.

3. Set-Off and Counterclaim <s=»41
Under California law, where parties
each had promissory notes from the other
and had made cross demands on them, demand barred by statute of limitations
would only be barred to the extent that it
was greater than the opposmg claim.
West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 431.70.

Feb. 28, 1985.

4. Evidence <£=>80(1)
In absence of appropriate references to
the applicable law of foreign jurisdiction,
that law will be presumed to be the same
as Utah law. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-45.

Sisters who had each borrowed money
from their father on promissory notes and
inherited shares of the balance remaining
on each note after his death brought actions against each other to recover
amounts due. The Fourth District Court,
Millard County, J. Harlan Burns, J., awarded $236.49 to one sister who had filed counterclaim to original action, and the other

5. Limitation of Actions <$=>41
Where sisters had claims against each
other on promissory notes, amount due one
sister on the note could be used as an
offset against the amount owed the other
up to the amount of the note, but sister
was not entitled to affirmative relief on the
offsetting time-barred counterclaim for the
amount owed in excess of the offset.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 13(i).

25. His opinion was reinforced, he testified, by
the report of a clinical psychologist, Christine
Swanson. She was a witness at trial, but her

opinion was excluded on the erroneous objection of defense counsel that it contained hearsay.

No. 18922.
Supreme Court of Utah.

JACOBSEN V. BUNKER

Utah 1209

Cite M 699 P.2d 1*08 (Utah 1985)

Dexter L. Anderson, Fillmore, for plaintiff and appellant
Robert D. Atwood, Logan, for defendants and respondents.
Eldon A. Eliason, Delta, for Bunker.

cobsen asserts that according to California
law, the statute ran from the date of her
last payment on October 15, 1973 and accordingly the last date that Bunker could
have brought her counterclaim was October 15, 1977.

STEWART, Justice:
The plaintiff, Joyce K. Jacobsen, appeals
from a judgment which awarded $236.49 to
the defendant, Lorna K. Bunker, and which
held defendant William Rigby not liable as
an indemnitor. We reverse and remand for
entry of judgment in accordance with this
opinion.
The plaintiff Jacobsen and the defendant
Bunker are sisters. In the 1960's, Jacobsen and Bunker each borrowed money from
their father and signed promissory notes as
evidence of their indebtedness; neither
note was ever discharged. Jacobsen's last
payment on her note was made October 15,
1973; Bunker's last payment was made
January 5,1976. In 1976 their father died,
and one-third of the balance remaining on
each note was distributed on July 7, 1977,
to each sister and to a surviving brother.
On August 15,1978, Jacobsen sued Bunker
for her one-third share of the balance due
on the Bunker note. Bunker counterclaimed for one-third of the balance due on
the Jacobsen note. Jacobsen joined as a
defendant her ex-husband, William Rigby,
to pay the amount due on her note, if any,
pursuant to a "hold harmless" clause in a
divorce decree which dissolved the marriage between Jacobsen and Rigby.

[1,2] The law of California governs the
outcome of this case. Both litigants' notes
were executed and payable in California.
Utah Code Ann., 1953, section 78-12-45
provides:
When a cause of action has arisen in
another state or territory, or in a foreign
country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be maintained
against a person by reason of the lapse
of time, an action thereon shall not be
maintained against him in this state, except in favor of one who has been a
citizen of this state and who has held the
cause of action from the time it accrued.
"[W]here a contract is entered into and is
to be performed in a foreign jurisdiction
the law of that jurisdiction should be applied...." Morris v. Sykes, Utah, 624
P.2d 681, 683-84 (1981). The rule is the
same for promissory notes. Their legal
effect is governed by the law of the jurisdiction where they are executed and delivered. Bologna Brothers v. Morrissey, La.
App., 154 So.2d 455, 459 (1963).

The trial court offset the amount Jacobsen owed on her note against the amount
owed her on the Bunker note and awarded
Bunker a judgment for $236.49, the difference in the amounts owed on the two notes.
The trial court also ruled that defendant
Rigby was not liable on plaintiffs note
because of a settlement agreement executed subsequent to the divorce decree.
On appeal, Jacobsen's main contention is
that the California four-year statute of
limitations for actions on written instruments, Cal.Civ.Proc.Code section 337 (Deering 1972), bars Bunker's counterclaim. Ja-

Jacobsen argues that the California statute of limitations bars the counterclaims
even though it acts as a set-off. As authority, plaintiff cites 51 AmJur.2d Limitations of Actions § 78 at 657 (1970)
which states:
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, a demand pleaded by way of a
set-off, counterclaim, or crossclaim is regarded as an affirmative action in most
jurisdiction and therefore, unlike a matter of pure defense, is subject to the
operation of the statute of limitations,
and is unavailable if barred. [Footnotes
omitted.]
Bunker contends that a set-off is not
barred by the statute of limitations, citing
several Utah cases which have allowed setoffs based on claims that would otherwise
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have been barred by the statute of limitations.
[3,4] Neither party has cited any California law on this issue.1 In the absence of
appropriate references to the applicable
law of a foreign jurisdiction, that law* will
be presumed to be the same as Utah law.
Booth v. Crompton, Utah, 583 P.2d 82
(1978); Maple v. Maple, Utah, 566 P.2d
1229 (1977).

Rule 13(i). Accordingly, the judgment for
$236.49 is reversed.
Because of our ruling on the effect of a
set-off, we need not reach the issue of
Rigby's obligation, if any.
Reversed. Costs to appellant.
HALL, CJ., and HOWE, DURHAM and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

[5] Salt Lake City v. Telluride Power
Co., 82 Utah 607, 17 P.2d 281 (1932), held
that if a defendant had a counterclaim that
otherwise would have been barred by a
statute of limitations, the counterclaim
could be set-off against the plaintiffs
claim, notwithstanding the statute of limitations. The Court's analysis was based on
Comp.Laws of Utah section 6578 (1917)
which provided in relevant part:
When cross-demands have existed between persons under such circumstances
that, if one had brought an action
against the other, a counterclaim could
have been set up, the two demands shall
be deemed compensated so far as they
equal each other
See also Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler,
105 Utah 529, 144 P.2d 276 (1943); Annot.,
1 A.L.R.2d 630, § 13 (1948).
Rule 13(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure adopted that law. That rule
provides in part: "When cross demands
have existed between persons under such
circumstances that, if one had brought an
action against the other, a counterclaim
could have been set up, the two demands
shall be deemed compensated so far as
they equal each other
" Pursuant to
that rule, the amount due Bunker on the
Jacobsen note may be used as an offset
against the amount owed Jacobsen. However, Bunker is not entitled to affirmative
relief on the offsetting counterclaim under

Affirmed.
Zimmerman, J., concurred and filed an
opinion in which Durham, J., joined.

1. If California law were to be applied, defendant
Bunker's action would only be barred to the
extent it is greater than the plaintiffs claim.
See Cal.Civ.Code § 431.70 (Deering 1972) which
provides in relevant part:
Where cross-demands for money have existed
between persons at any point in time when
neither demand was barred by the statute of

liinitations, and an action is thereafter commenced by one such person, the other person
may assert in his answer the defense of payment in that the two demands are compensated so far as they equal each other, notwithstanding that an independent action asserting
his claim would at the time of filing the answer be barred by the statute of limitations.

AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE COMPANY, an Indiana corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a Utah
public transit district, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 18945.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 6, 1985.
Insurer of passenger on public transit
authority bus brought action against public
transit authority seeking indemnification
for uninsured motorist payments that insurer had made to its insured. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Philip R.
Fishier, J., entered summary judgment in
favor of public transit authority, and insurer appealed. The Supreme Court, Howe,
J., held that public transit authority, as a
qualified self-insurer, was not required to
provide uninsured motorist coverage for its
passengers.
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16 Utah 2d 397
Delbcrt M. YERGENSEN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Emmett D. FORD and N. E. Ferguson, dba
Ford & Ferguson, Defendants
and Respondents.

No. 10196.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 9, 1965.

and in such case, original claim loses its
character and identity and is merged in
judgment.
4. Limitation of Actions <&=?I39

Doctrine relating to acknowledgment
or part payment tolling period of limitations
applies only to cases founded upon assumpsit and has no application where, action
does not rest upon a promise.
5. Limitation of Actions <&=I39

Action to renew judgment.
The
Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, R. L. Tuckett, J., dismissed action on
ground that it was barred by limitations,
and the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme
Court, Callister, J., held that limitation
period in actions on judgment is not tolled
by provisions of statute tolling limitations
period in case of acknowledgment or part
payment in actions founded on contract.
Judgment affirmed.
I. Limitation of Actions C=>I39

Common law rule tolling limitation
period in case of acknowledgment or part
payment in all actions is not applicable to
action to renew judgment in view of statutory modification of common law rule restricting tolling of limitations to actions
founded upon contract U.C.A.1953, 6 8 3-2, 78-12-44.
2. Limitation of Actions <§=>I39

"Case founded on contract" within
statute providing for tolling of limitation
period in case of acknowledgment or of
part payment in action founded upon contract does not include judgment founded
on note, since final judgment for payment
of money extinguishes original claim on
note. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-44.

To suspend operation of statute of
limitations by acknowledgment, part payment or new promise, obligation on which
action is based must be founded upon promise and must not be in debt or covenant or
in actions in effect the same.
6. Judgment €=902

In action on judgment, debt is proper
form of action, and assumpsit will not lie
to enforce judgment.
7. Limitation of Actions <3=»I39

Judgment is not "contract'' within statute tolling limitations in cise of acknowledgment or part payment in action founded
upon contract. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-22, 7&12-23, 78-12-44.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
8. Execution <§=>!
Judgment <&=900

Money judgment forms basis for but
two legal proceedings: suit thereon brought
within eight years wherein judgment forms
basis or chose in action for judgment or
some form of proceeding in execution for
collection. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
69(a).
9. Limitation of Actions @=I39

3. Judgment <S=?582, 583

Limitation period in actions on judgment is not tolled by provisions of statute
tolling limitation period in case of acknowledgment or part payment in actions founded on contract. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-22, 7Z12-44, 78-22-1.

When valid and final judgment for
payment of money is rendered, original
claim is extinguished, and new cause of
action on judgment is substituted for it,

Richards, Bird & Hart, Salt Lake City,,
for appellant.

See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
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Christensen, Paulson & Taylor, Provo,
for respondents.
CALLISTER, Justice.
This is an action to renew a judgment
almost eight years and five months after
the date of its entry. The lower court
dismissed the action upon the ground that
it was barred by the statute of limitations. 1
The judgment in question was rendered
on September 15, 1949 in an action upon
three promissory notes. On April 18, 1950,
the defendants (judgment debtors), in order
to secure a lien release, entered into a
written agreement acknowledging the obligation and thereafter made payments totaling $450. The last payment was made on
October 10, 1950. The instant action was
commenced on February 5,1958—more than
eight years after judgment, but less than
eight years after the acknowledgment and
part payment.
Plaintiff first argues that inasmuch as
U t a h has no statute specifically providing
that an acknowledgment or pait payment
will not toll the limitation of Section 78-1222, the common law should prevail. 2 However, this state has modified the common
law rule 3 by the enactment of Section 7 8 12-44, U.CA.1953 which provides:
"In any case founded on contract,
when any p n of the principal or interest shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability,
•debt or claim, or any promise to pay
t h e same, shall have been made, an
action may be brought within the peTiod prescribed for the same after such
payment, acknowledgment or promise;
but such acknowledgment or promise
-must be in writing, signed by the party
1. 78-12-22, U.CA.1953: "Within eight
years: An action upon a judgment or
decree of any court of the United States,
or of any state or territory within the
United States."
2. 34 Am.Jur., Limitation of Actions, §
333f p. 262.
3. For a discussion of this rule, see Olson
v. Dahl. 99 Minn. 433, 109 N.W. 1001,
8 L.R.A.,N.S., 444 (1906).
402 P 2d—44Vi

to be charged thereby. When a right
of action is barred by the provisions
of any statute, it shall be unavailable
either as a cause of action or ground of
defense."
[1] Whereas the common law rule tolls
the limitation period in case of an acknowledgment or part payment in all actions, the foregoing statute restricts it only
to those actions founded upon contract.
Furthermore, a reasonable interpretation of
the last sentence of this statute would compel the conclusion that any statute which
bars a right of action is conclusive unless
its operation is suspended by the specific
provisions of 78-12-44. 4
It is next argued by plaintiff that the
phrase, "In any case founded on contract,"
contained in 78-12-44 includes the judgment in the instant action because it was
founded upon the promissory notes. In
effect, the plaintiff claims that the debt
(contract upon which his judgment was
rendered is revived so that it retains its
original character and thus falls withm the
tolling provisions of 78-12-44.
[2,3] This argument is without merit,
for when a valid and final judgment for the
payment of money is rendered, the original
claim is extinguished, and a new cause of
action on the judgment js substituted for
it. In such a case, the original claim loses
its character and identity and is merged in
the judgment. 5
Finally, plaintiff contends that the word
"contract," as used in 78-12-44 includes
judgments and thus the limitation period
of 78-12-22 may be tolled.
There is a division of authority as to
whether a judgment is considered to be a
4. 68-3-2, U.CA.1953: "The rule of the
common law that statutes in derogation
thereof are to be strictly construed has
no application to the statutes of this
state. * * *"
5. Restatement of Judgments, § 47.
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contract within the meaning of the limitation statutes.6 We adopt the view that it
is not and an action thereon is not ex
contractu.
[4—7] The doctrine relating to acknowledgment or part payment applies only to
cases founded upon assumpsit and has no
application where the action does not rest
upon a promise.7 To suspend the operation
of the statute, the obligation upon which the
action is based must be founded upon a
promise and must not be in debt or covenant
or in actions in effect the same. In an action on a judgment, debt is the proper form
of action, and assumpsit will not lie to
enforce it.8 Therefore, since an action on
a judgment will not lie in assumpsit and the
rule tolling the statute applies only to contracts based on a promise enforceable in
assumpsit, a judgment is not a contract
within the meaning of the limitation statutes.
That the legislature did not intend a judgment to be construed as a contract is evidenced by the fact that it limited actions
upon a written contract to six years 9 and
actions upon a judgment to eight years, thus
treating them separately.
[8] A money judgment forms the basis
for but two legal proceedings: (1) a suit
thereon, brought within eight years, wherein it forms the basis or chose in action for
a new judgment, or (2) some form of proceeding in execution for collection.10 Rule
69(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that process to enforce a judgment
shall be by writ of execution which may
issue at any time within eight years after
the entry of judgment. Thus, there is
6. 45 A.L.R.2d 968-984; 34 Am.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 335, p. 264.
7. Wood on Limitations (4th Ed.) § 66.
8. 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 851, p. 423; 7
C.J.S. Assumpsit, Action of § 7, p. 113.
9. 78-12-23, U.C.A.1953.
10. Youngdale v. Burton, 102 Utah 169, 128
P.2d 1053 (1942).

imposed an eight-year limitation period on
the two basic legal proceedings on a judgment, without any indication of an intent
upon the part of the legislature to extend
the period by part payment or written acknowledgment.
[9] There is also a strong policy argument for holding that the limitation period
on actions on judgments is not tolled by the
provisions of 78-12-44. It is provided in
Section 78-22-1, U.C.A.1953, that from the
time a judgment is docketed it becomes a
lien upon all real property of the judgment
debtor, both in the county where the judgment is entered and in any other county
of the state where the judgment is filed and
docketed. This lien continues for a period
of eight years unless the judgment is satisfied or the enforcement is stayed
A contract is ordinarily not a matter of
public record and the tolling of the statute
of limitations as provided in 78-12-44
would have no significant effect except upon
the parties to the contract. By contrast,
a judgment is a public record, and this
record is relied upon to determine the status
of legal title to real property. A written
acknowledgment or a part payment would
not ordinarily be reflected upon the official
records and, if they could extend the limitation period on judgments, it would not be
possible to ascertain from the public records
a correct assessment of the legal title to
real property.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment
of the lower court is affirmed.11 Costs to
defendants.
HENRIOD, C. J , and McDONOUGH,
CROCKETT, and WADE, JJ., concur.
II. For excellent discussions upholding this
view, see: Sharp v. Sharp, 154 Kan. 175,
117 P.2d 561 (1941); LaSalle Extension Univ. v. Barr, 19 N.J.Misc. 387, 20
A.2d 609 (1941); Giordano v. Wolcott,
46 N.J.Super. 278, 134 A.2d 593 (1957);
Mutual Trust & Deposit Co. v. Boone
(Ky.), 267 S.W.2d 751, 45 A.L.R.2d
962 (1954).
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general terms the conditions under wYnch a
petition for that purpose may be filed with
the County Commission for approval. We
do not see this as an improper delegation
of legislative authority to the County Commission, but as conforming with the constitutional mandate that "the legislature by
general laws shall provide for the incorporation . . .
of cities and towns in proportion to population . . . ." 8
[8] On the basis of what we have said
herein we are in accord with the views of
the trial court m rejecting the petitioners'
contentions, and in refusing to find that
the County Commission had acted beyond
its authority or so wholly without reason
as to be capricious and arbitrary and justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus.9
(All emphasis added.)
Affirmed. No costs awarded.
CALLISTER, C. J., and TUCKETT,
HENRIOD, and ELLETT, JJ , concur.
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28 Utah 2d 125
Carl T. EVANS, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
P I C K E T T BROS. FARMS, a partnership,
and Jess W. Pickett, otherwise known as
J. W. Pickett, Defendants and Appellants.

No. 12616.
Supreme Court of Utah
June 26, 1972
Action to recover unpaid balance on a
contract for work plaintiff performed m
leveling land owned by defendant. The
Fifth District Court, Iron County, J. Harlan Burns, J., rendered judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Calhster, C J., held that
where parties conducted preliminary nego8

Ibid.
499 P 2d—18

trations -with respect to ptemtiii's \eveYmg
of land owned by defendant, and after
completion of the work, the parties executed written contract which set forth amount
of remuneration that plaintiff was to receive for services he had previously rendered, and thereafter the agricultural stabilization and conservation service prepared
a written form that reqited that defendant
had received services, the total price, and
the share to be paid by the government,
there was an obligation to pay which was
founded upon a written instrument, and
hence plaintiffs action was governed by
six-year statute of limitation pertaining to
instrument in writing, rather than fouryear statute of limitations pertaining to
oral contracts
Affirmed.
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion.
Limitation of Actions $=>24(2)

Where parties conducted prehminar>
negotiations with respect to plaintiffs leveling of land owned by defendant, and after completion of the work, the parties executed written contract which set forth
amount of remuneration that plaintiff was
to receive for services he had previousl)
rendered, and thereafter the agricultural
stabilization and conservation service prepared a written form that recited that defendant had received services, the total
price, and the share to be paid by the government, there was an obligation to pay
which was founded upon a written instrument, and hence plaintiff's action to recover unpaid balance was governed by
six-year statute of limitation pertaining to
instruments m writing, rather than fouryear statute of limitation pertaining to oral
contracts. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-23, 78-1225.

Patrick H. Fenton, Cedar City, for defendants-appellants.
Durham Morris, Cedar City, for plaintiff-respondent
9. See authorities footnote 3 above.
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CALL1STER, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff initiated this action to recover
the unpaid balance on a contract for work
he performed in leveling 40 acres of land
owned by defendant. Defendant pleaded
both the four-year (Sec. 78-12-25, U.C.A.
1953) and six-year (78-12-23, U!C.A.1953)
statutes of limitation. Upon trial before
the court, judgment for the plaintiff was
rendered, and defendant appeals therefrom.
J. W. Pickett represented the partnership
in the transactions which ultimately led to
this action and will hereinafter be referred
to as defendant. In the autumn of 1959,
plaintiff and defendant went over the area
defendant desired to have leveled on the
farm. They discussed the price and plaintiff suggested that the hourly rate of $10
per hour was less expensive than a cubicyardage rate. Plaintiff estimated the cost
at approximately $1,800. Thereafter defendant made an application to the Department of Agriculture, since under one of its
programs the government would pay a portion of the cost. The Soil Conservation
Service performed certain engineering
work; defendant assisted in staking the
area to be leveled. An engineering work
sheet was prepared, which indicated the
amount of dirt to be removed; defendant
approved this sheet. Defendant contacted
plaintiff to proceed with the work; the
leveling was done between November 1
and November 29, 1959. Thereafter, to effect payment, a written form was prepared
by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (A.S.C.). This document was entitled Purchase Order For
Conservation Materials And Service; it
specified that the vendor was Carl Evans,
and the farmer was Pickett Brothers
Farms. The form specified that the vendor was authorized to furnish the farmer
named with the conservation materials or
services described in Section II, and that
delivery must be completed before December 15, 1959. Section II indicated the
acreage leveled and the cubic yardage involved, and that the sales price was $10

per hour. The total maximum cost was
listed as $2,465, and the maximum payment
by the government was designated as
$1,000. After completion of Sections I and
II, the document was submitted to defendant. Section III provided that the materials or services described in Section II had
been received and would be used in carrying out the approved practices under the
Agricultural Conservation Program for
which they were furnished. Defendant
signed and dated the form.
Subsequently, the government paid
$1,000. Defendant made payments of $100
on April 26, 1960, and $300 on September
3, 1961. On January 2, 1962, defendant
sent plaintiff a check for $700, which was
specially endorsed thereon that it was payment in full. Plaintiff refused to present
the check for payment and insisted that defendant owed a balance of $1,065. The instant action was filed on October 11, 1967.
The trial court found that plaintiff's
claim was governed by Section 78-12-23,
U.C.A. 1953, the six-year limitation upon
any contract, obligation or liability founded
upon an instrument in writing. The trial
court found that the limitation period commenced anew upon payment of $300 on
September 3, 1961. The statute was tolled
from January 2, 1962, to April 1, 1962,
when both partners were outside of the
state. The trial court, therefore, determined that plaintiffs action was not
barred by the statute of limitations.
Upon appeal, defendant asserts that the
trial court erred in its determination that
the six-year rather than the four-year statute of limitations controlled. Defendant
asserts that the leveling was done pursuant
to an oral contract, and that an action
thereon must be commenced within four
years as provided in Section 78-12-25, U.
C.A.1953.
In Bracklein v.
court stated that
founded upon an
when the contract,

I. 95 Utah 490, 500-501, 80 P.2d 471 (1938).

Realty Ins. Co.1 this
a cause of action is
instrument in writing
obligation, or liability
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grows out of the written instrument, not
remotely or ultimately, but immediately.
In the instant action, the parties conducted certain preliminary negotiations,
and plaintiff proffered an estimate of cost.
Subsequently, the engineering work was
performed and the exact work to be done
was specified in the engineering sheet. At
this time defendant requested plaintiff to
perform the leveling in accordance with
the engineering sheet. After completion of
the work, the parties executed the written
instrument, which set the amount of remuneration that plaintiff was to receive for
the services he had previously rendered.2
The purchase order recited that defendant
had received the services described in Section II; Section II specified the total
price, and the share to be paid by the government. Under the facts specified in this
instrument, the law will imply an obligation to pay. Since this instrument stated
the facts from which the law implied an

obligation to pay this obligation was
founded upon a written instrument within
Section 78-12-23, U.C.A.1953.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are awarded to plaintiff.
TUCKETT, HENRIOD and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent.
The parties orally agreed for the plaintiff to level some land belonging to the defendants, and pursuant to that agreement
the work was completed on November 29,
1959. Thereafter, to wit, on December 11,
1959, the Agricultural Conservation Program Service filled out a purchase order
for services showing that the plaintiff was
authorized to receive a maximum payment
from the government of $1,000. The material part of the purchase order is as follows:

Section III
(a)
Material or Service Specifications

(b)
Authorized
Quantity Unit

See ACP Handbook for Utah
(e)
Total Maximum Cost

40.0 acres
(f)
Cost-Share Value Of
Units Authorized
$1,000.00

$2,465.00

(c)
Furnished
Quantity Unit
41 acres
18,372 c. y.

(d)
Fair Price Or
Sales Price
Amount Per Hr.
$10.00
(g)
Maximum Payment
By Government
$1,000.00

Maximum Payment By Farmer
(Col. (e) less Col. (g)) $
Section III the materials or services described in Section II, columns (a) and (c). were received
by me and will be or have been used in carrying out the approved practices under the Agricultural Conservation Program for which they were furnished. I certify that the price paid to the
vendor does not exceed the difference between the fair price, if applicable, and the payment
by the Government.
(Sgd.) Pickett Bros. Farms by
J. W. Pickett, Mgr.

It is thus apparent to me that the document is not a written contract. It would
be some evidence of what some of the
terms of the oral contract might be. The
2.

'* .
.
. Where, however, services are
rendered because requested as a matter
of business and where consequently there
is a contemporaneous promise implied in
fact to pay for them, the weight of authority supports the validity of a subse-

document seems to me to be the same as
the one which might be given by me to a
benefactor who tells me he will pay onehalf of my obligation to the yard boy if I
quent promise defining the extent of the
promisor's undertaking." 1 Williston on
Contracts (3d Ed.), § 146, p. 633; also
see Sargent v. Crandall, 143 Colo. 199,
352 P.2d 676, 677 (1960) ; 17 Am.Jur.
2d Contracts, § 127, p. 474.
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will only sign a statement saying that the
work was done. That does not convert the
oral contract between me and the yard boy
into a written contract
We are not here concerned with the
question of whether the document might be
a sufficient memorandum to avoid the statute of frauds, for the statute of frauds is
not involved.
I think the contract in the instant matter
was oral and the defense of the statute of
limitations is good, and I would reverse the
judgment rendered and award costs to the
appellants.
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28 Utah 2d 129
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Rondo EASTMOND, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 12789.

Supreme Court of Utah.
July 11, 1972.

riving at the scene, arresting the boys on
suspicion of burglary; likewise, the
search of the automobile incident to the arrest was proper.
Affirmed.
I. Arrest <§»63(4)

In performing his duties as authorized
by statute relating to warrantless arrests, a
police officer is not required to meet any
such standard of perfection as to demand
an absolutely certain judgment before he
may act; rather, the test to be applied is
one which is reasonable and practical under the circumstances: whether a reasonable and prudent man in his position would
be justified in believing facts which would
warrant making the arrest. U.C.A.1953,
77-13-3.
2. Criminal Law C= 1158(4)
In ruling on the admissibility of evidence obtained as the result of a warrantless arrest, questions as to the validity of
the arrest and the justification for any
search made in connection therewith are
primarily for the trial court; and on appeal the Supreme Court will respect that
preogative and not upset the trial judge's
determination unless it clearly appears that
he was in error. U.C.A.1953, 77-13-3.
3. Arrest @»63(4), 71.1(5)

Appeal from an order of the Third
District Juvenile Court, Utah County, Paul
C. Keller, J., committing defendant to the
Utah State Industrial School for an offense which if committed by an adult
would be second-degree burglary. The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that where
police officer, at about 3:00 o'clock a. m.,
observed the lights of an automobile flash
on and the automobile pull away from
medical clinic, where, after stopping the
automobile and questioning three teenage
boys therein, he allowed it to proceed, and
where, after checking the medical clinic a
few minutes later, he discovered a broken
window and an unlocked door, the officer
was justified in radioing a request to have
the boys' automobile stopped and, upon ar-

Where police officer, at about 3:00
o'clock a. m.,. observed the lights of an
automobile flash on and the automobile
pull away from medical clinic, where, after
stopping the automobile and questioning
three teenage boys therein, he allowed it to
proceed, and where, after checking the
medical clinic a few minutes later, he discovered a broken window and an unlocked
door, the officer was justified in radioing
a request to have the boys' automobile
stopped and, upon arriving at the scene,
arresting the boys on suspicion of burglary; likewise, the search of the automobile
incident to the arrest was proper.
4. Searches and Seizures <§=>7(I0)
Where a police officer observes some
property in plain sight which he has good

